CHAPTER IV
ASKING RHODEY FOR FORGIVENESS

I think, modesty aside, that I was a fairly good Delegate. I had an active role in foreign and regional affairs, I made myself present and helpful to people on the gameside, forum and chat, and I tried to keep the region active and engaged. One area where I feel I did fail, and rather unambiguously at that, was in building a successful military. There is no need for subtitles or detailed descriptions of my policies, because there hardly were any. I’ll indulge myself, however, and add some subtitles that will shed some light on my actual experience in military affairs, and why I consider my military policy, or lack thereof, to be an almost uncertain failure.

My Military Experience

I have never been an active participant in military gameplay. My closest experience in an operation comes from one time that I was invited by Unibot to witness an operation, probably a defence or a liberation, during a major update. I have never been WA mobile, with the notable exception of the time during the Milograd Coup when I endorsed Brutland and Norden with a different nation, so I have never been able to participate in an operation. I had served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, I had led cultural projects during my time as Deputy Minister of Regional Affairs and as Vice Delegate, but I had never had, nor would I ever have, actual experience with military gameplay. It should come as no surprise then that I delegated most operational decision making to the Minister of the Army.

Policy or Lack Thereof

During most of my delegacy I was still an ardent believer in Independence, so my basic policy towards the military was to agree to any operation, be it defence, liberation or raid, that was consistent with our regional interests, however nebulous those might be. Keeping the region and military active was one such interest, and, being then so ignorant about the minutiae of military affairs, I felt comfortable leaving to the Minister to decide which operations satisfied that requirement.

Admittedly, some operations did relate more to serious foreign policy matters, and were look at more closely. We would often try to avoid operations that conflicted with the FRA-UIAF War. The Osiris-Lazarus War started around late August, and we had to decide if we would take sides in the conflict, particularly since we had recently allied ourselves with Lazarus. These were specific cases, however, and did not have an impact, largely, on the overall operation of the Special Forces, which functioned under the leadership of Geomania and QuietDad.

Delegating

I then decided to delegate to the Minister of the Army much more than I did with other ministers, with whose portfolios I had experience. Geomania was a historical titan, our second ever Minister of Foreign Affairs and someone who had been around during the earliest days of the Coalition. He had a wealth of experience, and did an amazing job at leading the Special Forces with talent, grace and diplomacy, particularly given later problems with OnderKelkia. QuietDad was similarly skilled, and trained several future leaders of our military. He still has a presence in the region, even to this day, and despite disagreements that I’ve had with his view on certain policies, I have tremendous respect for him, and for how he rose to the challenge given my ineptitude in this area.

Regrets

I do regret not having more experience with military affairs. Despite the best efforts of Geomania and QuietDad, and they did perform beautifully, we didn’t manage to build Special Forces into the powerhouse that they are today. On the one hand, I think that is simply the product of its time. Things were different in 2014, and to some extent, the circumstances simply weren’t right for the development of our military as it has. In that sense, I feel not everything is our fault, and indeed Geomania and QuietDad built a very decent and active military with the resources and opportunities that they had. On the other hand, I wonder if my limited knowledge in that field meant that I wasn’t there to provide any needed support, or if I could have done more to promote our military, seek foreign partners and opportunities, or just highlight our successes, so that more citizens would join.

As I finish writing this chapter, perhaps our military was not an unmitigated disaster. We did have some successes, and were a decent and respected force at the time. We did have some issues, and didn’t get to where we wanted to be, but there was as much about our failures, and perhaps even more, as it was about the circumstances of the time. I do believe, however, that I could have done more to help develop the military. As my advice to future leaders, particularly future Prime Minister, I would suggest gaining a knowledge, however rudimentary, of all aspects of regional governance. You need not be an expert in all, but it never hurts to have the ability to help where help is needed, and to do a little bit more to ensure that the region is at its best.