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High Court of the South Pacific
HCLQ 1913: Legality of Plea Bargains
A question on whether the High Court of the South Pacific has the authority to enter into plea deals in lieu of conducting a full trial.
Petitioner: Beepee
Date of Submission: March 20th, 2019
Date of Justiciability: March 20th, 2019
Date of Opinion: October 11th, 2020
Legal Question(s):
Does the High Court have the ability, under the letter of the law, to enter into (or ratify) plea bargains for reduced sentences upon an early admission of guilt or an acceptance of guilt?
Does the High Court have the power to approach a respondent to seek a change in their plea?
Amicus Curiae Briefs: Volaworand (March 21st, 2019), Beepee (March 23rd, 2019), Nat (March 23rd, 2019)
Summary of the Opinion:
It is the opinion of the Court that plea bargains do not exist in the South Pacific, nor can the High Court use them in its normal function unless the Assembly of the South Pacific explicitly authorizes its creation via an amendment to the Judicial Act. Further, since plea bargains are not allowed under current law, the Court seeking to change the plea of a defendant (i.e. without a deal) is unethical and hence discouraged, even if it is not strictly illegal.
Justice Griffindor delivered the opinion, signed also by Justice Nat.
Disclaimer(s) on the opinion:
- When ‘the Court’ is used in this opinion, it refers to the High Court as an institution represented through the opinion of the presiding justice, Griffindor. When ‘High Court’ is used in this opinion, it refers to the High Court as an institution or because it explicitly references ‘the Court’s’ actions in HCCC1902: Nakari v. North Prarie and Concrete Slab.
- The opinion contained herein is the sole product of the presiding Justice, Griffindor. Secondary Justice Nat was uninvolved in the production of the opinion, save for their legal analysis and feedback on the overall grammar and formatting of the opinion. No undue conflict of interest hence manifested as a result of their Amicus Curiae brief provided in this case prior to Justice Nat’s appointment to the High Court.
To begin to explain the opinion presented herein, the Court must provide background on how the plea bargain entered the proceedings of the High Court. Plea bargains arose out of the yet ongoing HCCC1902: Nakari v. North Prarie and Concrete Slab criminal case. In the trial, the defendants, North Prarie and Concrete Slab are alleged to have been engaged in bribery and contempt of court, both of which are crimes under the laws of the South Pacific. Nakari filed these charges with the High Court on February 12th, 2019, and was accompanied by evidence that the crime had occurred. Chief Justice Kringle, seeing enough evidence to move forward, indicted North Prarie and Concrete Slab later on that same day.
Upon the trial officially beginning, North Prarie posted on February 16th, 2019. His defense provided a transcript of the conversation, his explanation of it, and what he perceived to have taken place in said conversation. At the end of his opening defense, he asked the High Court for mercy in its decision citing his youth [in real life] as the reason for acting the way he did, not knowing that his activity was potentially wrong. Following this testimony, North Prarie posted on March 16th, 2019 an agreement that he would plead guilty to the charge of contempt of court in exchange for a reduced sentence. Some of the members of the region were surprised and even shocked by the sudden creation of plea bargains as a tool for the High Court to use. Justice Belschaft later on the same day justified the High Court’s action by calling plea bargains a “logical extension of [the High Court’s] power to determine guilt and issue sentence.”[1]. Shortly after this justification was given on March 20th, 2019, a legal question was brought before the Court asking if plea bargains were lawful, which is where the case stands today.
Now that we have an understanding of how and why plea bargains have been established, we can begin to answer the questions presented to the Court. On the question of whether or not the High Court has the ability, under current law, to engage in plea bargains, the Court determines that it does not.
The Court reached its decision by analyzing the many rules pertaining to the High Court’s processes and function, most notably, the text of the Judicial Act. The Court also through its own conclusions took into account the information presented in the amicus briefs of all those that presented one, but most notably Nat’s amicus brief. The opinion contained herein will cover several parts of the Judicial Act in relation to the case as well as the meaning of Nat’s amicus brief.
As laid out in Article 2, Section 1, Subsection a, the High Court shall only “rule upon what is written in law”[2]. This means that the High Court must not only arrive at a decision on a trial or case by examining the relevant laws and processes involved, but also ensure that any result produced follows the existing process for conducting business of the High Court as well. As such, the High Court has no authority to invent the plea bargain, which has no basis in an existing law passed by the Assembly. Hence, the ability for the High Court to use plea bargains does not currently exist and would continue to not do so unless the Assembly granted the High Court such power. Were the High Court to decide cases by using plea bargains, which are outside of what is currently written within the law, it could create a potential future where judicial activism becomes prevalent and the High Court Justices actively legislate on the bench, and outside of the halls of the Assembly of the South Pacific. Such judicial activism goes against the aforementioned Article 2, Section 1(a) of the Judicial Act.
Moving further, the Court also finds that plea bargains are not able to be used by the High Court because of their lack of transparency. According to Article 8, Section 1 of the Judicial Act, all “material submitted for a case shall be submitted alongside the case proceedings in a public venue”[3]. Of course, the very next section of the Article does allow for confidential information (not publicly known knowledge or private information relating to the real-life person) or classified information (not publicly known information from other regional government institutions or other regions), but this information must then be published in a redacted form on the case thread. The way the plea bargain was used was not in the public eye, rather it was behind closed doors. Further, the contents of the deal have not (as of yet) been made public for the region as a whole to come in compliance with the second section of Article 8 in the Judicial Act. All of these factors played a part in causing plea bargains to violate Article 8, Section 1 of the Judicial Act.
The Court next looks at Article 6, Section 1 of the Judicial Act, which states that “[a] sentencing case is started when an individual has been found guilty after being indicted”[4]. In what is the only instance of a plea bargain thus far, the plea bargain was introduced mid-trial rather than following a guilty verdict. As a result of this, the High Court violated the sequence of events during a trial by deciding on a sentence before an official verdict was reached. Perhaps a remedy to this could have been the defendant admitting guilt, and then allowing the High Court to move into a sentencing phase where leniency in the final sentence could have been given. The Court agrees with Sandaoguo[5], when he suggested that same thing in the wake of the plea bargain having been introduced.
The last component that the Court used to decide its position was the amicus brief of the then private citizen and legislator, Nat. The Court will adopt Nat’s second half of his amicus brief verbatim into the opinion, posted below:
The literal interpretation of this law is that the High Court (through the assigned Justice) will analyze the case only after they have received all necessary information and evidence. This does not produce an absurdity (it is simply a non-burdensome requirement for due process) and is the lone literal interpretation. Therefore, this reading is the correct reading (HCLQ1805). In order for the High Court to enter into and then later ratify a de facto plea deal, it would have to analyze the sentencing question prior to a sentencing case being open (since, as argued above, a sentencing case can only be opened after a finding of guilt). As submissions are permissible for any case (Judicial Act 3.4), the High Court could not be satisfied it has all the necessary information and evidence prior to the close of the sentencing case submission period. Therefore, a de facto plea deal would mean the High Court would analyze the sentencing question prior to knowing it has received all the necessary information and evidence. This would be in conflict with the Judicial Act (3.6) and, as a violation of process, would be liable to an appeal (Judicial Act 7.3)[6].
The Court agrees with the amicus brief provided due to its logical and convincing argument. Not only do plea bargains not exist within existing regional law, and lack the transparency of normal proceedings of the High Court, but plea bargains also violate the sequence of events provided for in a case to ensure that all evidence is brought before the High Court. As Nat describes, entering into a plea bargain would upset the order and submission of evidence. To rectify this, Nat leaves open the possibility of a post-evidence plea bargain which could be considered if it came at the point before the verdict. For the Court, however, at that point in the case, the only other step would be a ruling in which the Justice decides the verdict, which would make a plea bargain impractical. Thus, in practice, plea deals cannot operate under the current law.
The Court finds itself in a delicate position with the consideration of this legal question. The High Court, as an institution, is able to check and curtail an overreach of power in any facet of government in the South Pacific, including itself. This opinion is a reminder that not even the High Court of the South Pacific, which interprets what the law means, is immune from having its power curtailed. In closing this opinion, the Court will summarize one last time the opinion contained herein. The Court hereby finds that plea bargains do not exist in the South Pacific, nor can the High Court use them in its normal function unless the Assembly of the South Pacific explicitly authorizes their creation via an amendment to the Judicial Act. Further, since plea bargains are not allowed under current law, the Court seeking to change the plea of a defendant (i.e. without a deal) is unethical and hence discouraged, even if it is not strictly illegal.
It is so ordered.
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