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**Belschaft** · 04-27-2017, 11:35 AM

Under the procedures of Article 3, Clause 7 of the Court Procedures Act I am submitting an appeal of Permanent Justice Farengeto's ruling in HCLQ1705 on the basis of a contradiction of law. I request that an Appellate Justice be assigned to handle this matter.

_{Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making}
^{Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator}

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Feirmont · 04-27-2017, 03:42 PM

This appeal is currently under review.

Appellate justice is me for this.

#EC4Lyfe

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(This post was last modified: 04-27-2017, 03:42 PM by Feirmont.)

**Belschaft** · 04-27-2017, 04:38 PM

Your honour,

In his ruling on HCLQ1705 Justice Farengeto errs severely, and in doing so produces several contradictions of law. As such, it is imperative that this ruling be overturned and new ruling issued.

In his ruling Justice Farengeto refers to Article 3.1 of the Charter, and on this basis proclaims; "Statements made outside the jurisdiction of the High Court in non-judicial contexts that may be interpreted as suggesting criminal actions - made formally or informally - can therefore not be considered as “criminal accusations” for the purposes of Article 3.2."

Article 3 of the Charter and Article 3.1 in specific applies only to members of the Coalition - this specific word being used in both the preambulary clause of Article 3, and in Article 3.1 itself. Your honour, the CRS is not a member of the Coalition, it is an institution of the Coalition. The CRS does not possess individual rights, nor can it's statements or actions be considered covered by "free speech". Statements or actions of the CRS are not merely opinions of an individual, but represent an official statement or action of the institution and carry legal weight and effect. Whilst an individual may have - in the absence of laws against defamation - the right to make accusations of criminal behaviour without pressing charges, the CRS does not. Your honour, this is a clear and unquestionable contradiction of the law, and by itself renders the entire ruling invalid.

In addition to this Justice Farengeto makes further error by issuing a ruling with the effect of abridging the right to a fair trial, in direct contradiction of Article 3.2 that explicitly prohibits such. Article 3.2 states "criminal accusations" in regards to the right to a trial, but Justice Farengeto interprets this as meaning the "formal filing of criminal charges". Your honour, this is blatantly absurd. The "formal filing of criminal charges" is the first part of the legal process to begin a trial under our laws, and as such under Justice Farengeto's ruling an individual only has a right to a fair trial where they are already receiving one. This has the effect of negating Article 3.2 entirely, as a body such as the CRS can act entirely legally by substituting a non-judicial process for the mandated judicial one, and yet not have breached an individuals right to a fair trial. Bill of rights protections do not only apply in one specific section of this forum. An individual is not guaranteed a fair trial against criminal accusations made in the High Court, but against criminal accusations in general.

We address here not only a question of legal theory but also a question of legal facts. This matter is not theoretical, but relates to the way the CRS is currently exercising it's powers under the SPA. I quote from the CRS report issued on the 24th of April; "He aided a hostile foreign region, by providing advice on foreign affairs, divulging privileged information, and making offers to push back against anti-Osiris and anti-Empire sentiment in the region."

This clearly describes actions that would meet the legal definitions of Treason, Espionage and Organised Crime. "aided a hostile foreign region" is an obvious re-wording of "aiding any entity in which the Coalition is taking defensive action against", which is part of the literal definition of treason. No reasonable individual can interpret this in any way other than a criminal accusation, by an official institution of the Coalition. That this accusation is then followed by the imposition of a legal penalty makes this even clearer.

Your honour, the question at hand is not one of linguistic semantics, but of basic rights. A criminal accusation is not defined by where it is made or via what form of wording, but by the legal effect it has. By interpreting the right to a trial in such a manner that it only applies should the body making criminal accusations wishes it to - which is the effect of Justice Farengeto's ruling - this right has been abridged to such an extent as to render it non-existent. Should the CRS be allowed to choose whether or not those they make criminal accusations against receive a trial, no individual so accused will ever receive a trial. It is precisely this kind of unconstitutional behaviour that Article 3.2 is meant to prevent.

_{Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making}
^{Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator}

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**Farengeto** · 04-28-2017, 09:40 AM

If I may issue a brief response on the appeal:

Belschaft's first point has validity but it is misleading and ultimately tangential to the arguments in HCLQ 1705. Article 3.1 is cited only once in the ruling, at the end of the section on criminal accusations. It makes no statements about Article 3.1, and does not specify individuals or groups (such as the CRS) in its statement. The statement only reaffirms the existence of the rights provided by Article 3.1 for members to make such statements.

Much of the remainder of Belschaft's appeal is based not on specific areas of law but rather in the gaps of the law. As a long-time Justice I do not prefer extrajudicial actions, but I am bound by the law alone when issuing rulings. That our laws may leave open the possibility for extrajudicial action is not the fault of the court.

In fact most of this argument on the right to a trial remains beyond the scope of the original question. With the focus on the SPA as a whole in the argument surrounding this case we must remember the scope of the original question:

Quote:When an accusation of criminal behaviour or activities that would equal such (as defined by the Criminal Code of the South Pacific) has been made, may a process other than a Criminal Trial (as defined by the Court Procedures Act) be substituted for a Criminal Trial?

The decision of interpreting "criminal accusations" to refer to formally filed charges was not arbitrary, it and similar uses of accusation are used by various real world legal systems, such as Canada and the United States, for the same purpose and after deliberation it was decided that this same definition should apply in TSP law.

But on the matter of the right to a trial the Court simply cannot provide a trial where none would legally take place. When criminal charges are pressed the right to a trial that is fair is irrefutable, but the Court cannot hold a criminal trial when no criminal accusations (as defined by the Court in HCLQ1705) have taken place. The court cannot prevent individuals from making such statements nor can it currently compel the filing of charges. While there may be overlap in the claims of the CRS in laws such as the SPA and criminal charges these formal and informal statements are not equivalent from a judicial perspective. As these statements do not prevent a trial that would occur from occuring, nor are they criminal accusations in the context of Article 3.2 that one's defense against be infringed upon, there is therefore no contradiction to our laws.

As I mention in my ruling this is not to say the SPA is wholly legal, merely that in the limited context of allegedly "substituting" a criminal trial the court finds no contradiction between Article 3.2 and the SPA.

**Belschaft** · 04-28-2017, 10:58 AM

Your honour,

Whilst I greatly respect Justice Farengeto and have found most of his past rulings to be correct, it is clear that he again makes the same error in conflating the CRS and an individual member of the Coalition. Whilst he is correct that "the court cannot prevent individuals from making such statements nor can it currently compel the filing of charges", the CRS is not an individual and cannot be treated as one. A statement made by an individual is merely an opinion, whilst an action of the CRS bearing legal effect is not. It is this continuous conflation of individuals and institutions that produces a contradiction of law.

_{Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making}
^{Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator}

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(This post was last modified: 04-28-2017, 10:59 AM by Belschaft.)

**Farengeto** · 04-28-2017, 11:29 AM

While Belschaft may potentially be valid in arguing they are different, the matter is ultimately irrelevant to my point. With individuals or groups the court cannot compel them to do either. Furthermore while many of these groups in The South Pacific possess *legal* weight, none except the Court possess the *Judicial* weight that is ultimately relevant to Article 3.2.

**Belschaft** · 04-28-2017, 04:44 PM

Justice Farengeto is correct that the CRS does not possess Judicial weight, but errs in thinking that this is irrelevant to Article 3.2. It is precisely because the CRS does not possess Judicial weight that the SPA infringes upon the rights granted by Article 3.2, in that the SPA grants the CRS powers over matters of a criminal and judicial nature.

_{Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making}
^{Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator}

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**Belschaft** · 05-15-2017, 01:03 PM

*coughs politely*

_{Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making}
^{Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator}

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**Belschaft** · 05-27-2017, 10:24 AM

To ease the burden on the court, and as the law in question has been amended, I withdraw this matter.

_{Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making}
^{Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator}

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