| Legal Question: Delegate voting counting methodology |
Your honor,
for convenience of the discussion, I would like to specify various methods and how they map to what has been presented, both here and on Discord. Voting Method 1: Also called "Elimination STV"; this is the method that Belschaft ostensibly proposes.
Voting Method 2: The "Glen" method and proposed by Sandaoguo as method A. This is similar to Voting Method 1, except that the process runs twice to select one winner each for a total of two winners.
Voting Method 3: The misnamed "Bel" method. This is what many (myself included) assumed Belschaft requested, and what Sandaoguo described as method B.
A fourth voting method could be included here, which would be a quota-based STV, with the justification that Belschaft assumes this is the method Sandaoguo seeks. However, the actual mechanics thereof will likely be irrelevant for the discussion, so I will skip this for the sake of brevity unless the court requests otherwise. ![[Image: XXPV74Y.png?1]](https://i.imgur.com/XXPV74Y.png?1)
In response to Roavin, there is no “Glen Method.” He’s mistaken or maybe misremembering.What is being ascribed to me in his brief is not something I have or am proposing. (It’s actually a method that Roavin proposed himself last year, instead.) Method A in my original LQ is “elimination STV.” However, what Roavin is calling “eliminations STV” is not any version of STV I’m familiar with.
The Court would like to remind the public that it is not currently considering the first question posed by sandaoguo, related to the vote counting method for Delegate elections.
Inviato dal mio iPhone utilizzando Tapatalk Former Delegate of the South Pacific
Posts outside High Court venues should be taken as those of any other legislator. I do not participate in the regional server, but I am happy to talk through instant messaging or on the forum. Legal Resources: THE MATT-DUCK Law Archive | Mavenu Diplomatic Archive | Rules of the High Court | Case Submission System | Online Rulings Consultation System
Your honour,
To clear up any confusion as to how the current electoral system is designed to work for Delegate elections, please see the following. Eight candidates are standing for Delegate – Andrew, Arthur, Beth, Ben, Carl, David, Elisabeth and Fred. Andrew and Arthur are members of the Awesome Party and Beth and Ben are members of the Best Party. There are exactly 100 voters in this election. The first preference votes are as follows; Andrew - 35 Arthur - 2 Beth - 31 Ben - 3 Carl - 11 David - 8 Elisabeth - 6 Fred – 4 It can clearly be seen that Andrew and Beth are the frontrunners, each being the favoured candidate of their own party – but neither has anything like a majority of the votes. Under FPTP we would simply select them and proceed to the next round of voting, but as we use a form of IRV/STV we don’t; we instead reallocate votes, proceeding with the candidate/s with the least number of votes. In this case that is Arthur. Andrew – 35+2=37 Arthur - 2 Beth - 31 Ben - 3 Carl - 11 David - 8 Elisabeth - 6 Fred – 4 Arthur’s votes go to Andrew, who is in the same party. At this point no candidate has a majority and we continue reallocation; the next candidate to be eliminated is Ben. Andrew – 35+2=37 Arthur - 2 Beth – 31+2=33 Ben - 3 Carl – 11 David - 8 Elisabeth – 6+1=7 Fred – 4 This process continues, with Fred being the next to be eliminated. Andrew – 35+2=37+3=40 Arthur - 2 Beth – 31+2=33 Ben - 3 Carl – 11 David - 8 Elisabeth – 6+1=7+1=8 Fred – 4 We are now in a situation we’re both David and Elisabeth are tied with eight votes – as David has more first preference votes the EC would break the tie in his favour, and eliminate Elisabeth. Andrew – 35+2=37+3=40 Arthur - 2 Beth – 31+2=33+4=37 Ben - 3 Carl – 11 David – 8+4=12 Elisabeth – 6+1=7+1=8 Fred – 4 David has no overtaken Carl, so he is eliminated. Andrew – 35+2=37+3=40+5=45 Arthur - 2 Beth – 31+2=33+4=37+3=40 Ben - 3 Carl – 11 David – 8+4=12+3=15 Elisabeth – 6+1=7+1=8 Fred – 4 We now have three candidates remaining; Andrew with 45 votes, Beth with 40 votes and David with 15 votes. In a Cabinet election – which is “single winner” – we would then eliminate David and reallocate his votes, which would reduce us to two candidates – one of whom would have an absolute majority and be the winner. As this is a Delegate election, we do not do that; we now can identify Andrew and Beth as the candidates ranked first and second under IRV, and thus they are selected for the next round of the Delegate election. We could have done this earlier – when Ben was eliminated it became impossible for any other candidate to overtake Beth, but I have run the process to this stage as that would not always be the case; it is possible that an election may not be decided till the point where we are left with three candidates. I will refer to this as “Multi-Winner IRV” or “Simple Elimination STV”. Why not use “proper” STV? In “proper” STV systems you conduct multiple simulated rounds of voting, restarting without the winning candidate each time. This way everyone’s preferences are taken into account each time, whilst in Simple Elimination STV those who vote for the first ranked candidate have no say in selecting the second candidate. However, I feel that this does not make it a necessarily superior model – there is no “perfect” election system, there are just different systems which each have their own strengths and weaknesses. When you choose a system you are also choosing an outcome; different election systems will produce different results, with varying levels of preference for certain types of candidates. Approval voting will strongly favour consensual candidates with “soft” support who no one objects to, regardless of whether or not they possess “strong” support. First Past The Post will strongly favour candidates with “strong” support, regardless of whether or not a majority likes them – they just need to have the largest minority. It is vital that people understand that when we choose an election system we are also choosing what kind of result we are going to get. To use a “proper” version of STV, we must also use a quota of some sorts; too see why, we can re-run the previous election without one, starting from where we left off. Andrew – 35+2=37+3=40+5=45 Arthur - 2 Beth – 31+2=33+4=37+3=40 Ben - 3 Carl – 11 David – 8+4=12+3=15 Elisabeth – 6+1=7+1=8 Fred – 4 No candidate has a majority, so David is eliminated as he has the least votes – these then go to Beth. Andrew – 35+2=37+3=40+5=45 Arthur - 2 Beth – 31+2=33+4=37+3+40+15=55 Ben - 3 Carl – 11 David - 8 Elisabeth – 6+1=7+1=8+4=12+3=15 Fred – 4 Beth is elected with 55 votes. The process is then repeated with her eliminated. Andrew - 35 Arthur - 2 Beth - 31 Ben – 3+31=33 Carl - 11 David - 8 Elisabeth - 6 Fred – 4 Beth’s votes then go to Ben, the second candidate from the Best Party. Arthur has the least votes, and they go to Andrew again. Andrew – 35+2=37 Arthur - 2 Beth - 31 Ben – 3+31=34 Carl - 11 David - 8 Elisabeth - 6 Fred – 4 This time round Ben isn’t eliminated – Fred is, and is votes go as previously. Andrew – 35+2=37+3=40 Arthur - 2 Beth - 31 Ben – 3+31=33 Carl - 11 David - 8 Elisabeth – 6+1=7 Fred – 4 Elisabeth is next to be eliminated, and her votes go to Ben. Andrew – 35+2=37+3=40 Arthur - 2 Beth - 31 Ben – 3+31=34+7=41 Carl - 11 David - 8 Elisabeth – 6+1=7 Fred – 4 David’s votes go to Ben. Andrew – 35+2=37+3=40 Arthur - 2 Beth - 31 Ben – 3+31=34+7=41+8=49 Carl - 11 David - 8 Elisabeth – 6+1=7 Fred – 4 Carl is eliminated, and his votes split between Andrew and Ben – but Ben gets more. Andrew – 35+2=37+3=40+5=45 Arthur - 2 Beth - 31 Ben – 3+31=34+7=41+8=49+6=55 Carl - 11 David - 8 Elisabeth – 6+1=7 Fred – 4 Ben is elected. The Best Party has two candidates in the in-game election. Now, this is not necessarily going to happen – indeed, it is relatively unlikely that the same party would get both candidates through to the in-game election. However, it is a distinct possibility – and what will regularly happen is that two candidates who are similar, if not from the same party, are selected. This is why “proper” STV uses a quota to decide who is elected, and a system to decide how “excess” votes – votes above the quota received by the winning candidate – are reallocated, which could be entirely random or involve fractions of votes. What is wrong with Quotas and Fractions? Academically? Nothing. In practice? Lots. Voting systems need to be as simple as possible, and readably understandable to laymen; the public at large does not understand, and distrusts, systems that make use of quotas, formulas and fractional votes. As a general rule of thumb I consider any election system that cannot have the result worked out with pen and paper to be flawed; not because it produces a “bad” result, but because the process involved is too complex for the general public. Why Simple Elimination STV? When choosing an election system for TSP, I considered several things to be “desirable”; 1. That voters not be penalised for voting for their favourite candidate 2. That there should not be a penalty for having more candidates in the election 3. That “strong” support be preferred over “soft” support 4. That the two selected candidates be distinct and “represent” different voters 5. That the two selected candidates should have substantial support I selected Simple Elimination STV as it meets these criteria. Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making
Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator ![[Image: B9ytUsy.png]](https://i.imgur.com/B9ytUsy.png)
While Belschaft has just reaffirmed Method A as the valid meaning of the law, given the ambiguity that exists nonetheless, I will not be withdrawing that question. The Assembly is unlikely to pass a simple clarifying amendment, given the interest thus far in seeking different methods altogether if the Elections Act is reopened for debate.
As for the question the Court is currently handling— the one of jurisdiction— I do believe that the Election Commission is the venue of first resort while an election is ongoing. However, given the nature of this Legal Question as a question over the meaning of law, the Election Commission would be required anyways to forward it to the High Court. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
HIGH COURT OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC
- HCLQ1712 - JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT IN ELECTION LAW DOES THE HIGH COURT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS QUESTION PRIOR TO AN ELECTION, PER THE CHARTER’S GRANT OF POWER TO THE HIGH COURT FOR CLEARING AMBIGUITIES IN LAW? OR MUST A CONCERNED PERSON WAIT UNTIL AN ELECTION IS CONDUCTED TO LODGE A COMPLAINT WITH THE ELECTION COMMISSION, AND FORWARD IT TO THE HIGH COURT IF NEEDED, UNDER ARTICLE 1.5 OF THE ELECTIONS ACT? 12 JANUARY 2017 Justice KRINGLE delivered the Opinion.
Summary of the Ruling It is the opinion of the Court that Article 1, Section 5 of the Elections Act does not preclude the High Court from directly hearing legal questions regarding election law; instead it prevents the Election Commission from hearing such disputes, requiring that it refer them to the Court for proper review. This interpretation comes as a result of the general prerogative afforded to the Court over the interpretation of laws and the language of Section 5, which suggests that it seeks to establish and clarify the jurisdiction of the Election Commission, rather than limit the jurisdiction of the Court.
While the High Court has a general prerogative to hear questions on matters of law in all cases, the law does not necessarily provide a uniform way for the manner in which such questions should be submitted. Various laws provide for various ways in which questions may but submitted, and clearly detail the circumstances that must be met for such submissions to take place. In the present case, the question requires the Court to determine if controversies of law related to an election may be submitted directly under the aforementioned general prerogative, or if a lengthier process, involving the Election Commission, must be followed instead.
I
A. General Prerogative of the Court in Matters of Law
A well-established principle of the concept of an independent judiciary is the fact that only the Court may hear and decide on controversies on matters of law, resolve contradictions between the laws and reverse government actions and policies that may contradict the law. This general prerogative is a natural extension of the role of the judiciary as a coequal branch of government, but can also be found in writing in the Charter of the South Pacific, whose Article VIII enshrines the various roles, duties, responsibilities and prerogatives of the Court. Article VIII is divided into two sections: one devoted to the structure of the Court, the other devoted to the powers of the Court. The four sections that comprise the latter form the legal basis for what could be called the general prerogative of the Court. This prerogative involves the voidance of laws, regulations or directives, the reconciliation of contradicting laws and directives, the clarification of provisions of law, and exclusivity over the conduction of criminal trials. In short, the Court is the final arbiter over the meaning of the laws, and the innocence or guilt of members. Section 6 is of particular interest to this case; it indicates that the Court “may clarify and interpret provisions of law, when presented with a Legal Question about them”. This is a clear indication that the Court, as a matter of general prerogative, can hear questions submitted by members, and may through them clarify and interpret the law. This is consistent with the often stated objective of providing clarity and predictability, a concept that was abundantly explored in Anachronism in the Court Procedures Act [HCLQ1712]. There are some considerations to this power. Is it absolute? Must submissions follow any procedure? Can the Court refuse to hear frivolous or mean intentioned questions? It is to the Court Procedures Act that one must refer in order to find these answers, and obtain further clarity on the environment in which this general prerogative is applied. Article 3, Section 1 of the Court Procedures Act indicate that a legal question may be submitted by any member on questions “on the meaning of a law, or on what is required or prohibited by law”. Sections 2 to 9 delve into the general process to be followed for the consideration of legal questions, and the conditions that must be met by both the Court and the petitioner. Article 3 is important in the sense that it provides structure to the general prerogative: the Court has a general power to interpret the law, but this power is not absolute or arbitrary, and must follow certain procedures in order to be made effective. B. Limitations and Alternative Mechanisms If the above is granted, however, some important questions still linger, and cause doubt on the exact limits to the power of the Court to directly take questions on matters of law. In explaining such limitations, the Court will dissent with Chancellor Palpatine and adopt a “dogmatic, narrow view”, since the forthcoming explanation must conform to the specific issue of this question, rather than the broader issue of general limitations to the powers of the Court. Sandaoguo points out in his submission that Article 1, Section 5 of the Elections Act might impose a limitation on the ability of the Court to directly hear legal questions. Section 5 indicates that any “election-related disputes will be arbitrated by the Election Commission”. It further indicates that, should any dispute refer to matters of election law, “the Election Commission shall refer it to the high Court.” While the wording of Section 5 might seem obvious and unavoidable, there are actually two possible and opposite ways to interpret its provisions. The first interpretation is that Article 1, Section 5 does indeed limit the general prerogative of the Court. While the Court is still allowed, not least of all by the authority conferred by the Charter, to hear questions regarding election law, these questions must be initially submitted to the Election Commission. In compliance with Section 5, the Commission must refer these questions to the Court. While the Court eventually receives the question and applies the process laid out in the Court Procedures Act, it cannot directly receive questions on election law as related to disputes on specific elections. There are certain issues with this interpretation, the main one being that it encroaches on the general prerogative of the Court to hear cases, while presenting no compelling reason for such encroachment. If the Court will hear the case eventually, why require that it first go through the Election Commission, whose only duty would be to transmit the question? This is certainly an interpretation, but there is another one which could make more sense, all circumstances considered. The second interpretation is slightly more complex, but possibly more logical. Section 5 does not prescribe the way in which legal questions related to election disputes must be handled, nor does it limit the ability of the Court to hear such questions directly. Instead, it limits the ability of the Election Commission to handle election disputes, by mandating that it refer to the Court any dispute that would qualify as a legal question, thereby protecting and preserving, rather than limiting, the general prerogative of the Court. There are some considerations to be discussed in order to know which interpretation is the more appropriate one. One is the importance of consistency and clarity within and among the laws, a matter already discussed in prior rulings, most recently in Anachronism in the Court Procedures Act [HCLQ1712]. One interpretation introduces a potential contradiction: the Court can directly consider all issues of legal interpretation through legal questions, except from that are indicated by an inferior law. Another interpretation preserves the general prerogative principle, and this inferior law even clarifies that disputes of a legal character must necessarily be handled by the Court. While one interpretation keeps consistency and harmony between higher and inferior laws, the other introduces a potentially disruptive element. Is it possible that such disruptive elements should exist? It is definitely possible, not least of all because laws, having been written by individuals, are therefore imperfect. This case is more complex because there is an equally valid and non-disruptive interpretation, which casts doubt into the need to accept the former interpretation, if the latter keeps harmony and is legally sound. In order to solve this controversy, one must take into account a second consideration: the language of the Section 5. It indicates that election-related disputes will be handled by the Election Commission, except those involving a matter of law, in which case “the Election Commission shall refer it to the High Court”. These two clauses are fundamental to understand the role of the Court in election disputes. The first clause establishes the general jurisdiction of the Election Commission, by declaring that it can handle “any election-related disputes”. The second clause then serves as a limit on that jurisdiction, by clarifying that disputes involving a matter of law must necessarily be referred to the High Court. Why must this be true? As Mel Brooks’ Van Helsing said after Lucy was freed, it truly is all about location. The second clause, which clarifies the legal pathway for disputes involving matters of law, forms part of the Elections Act. It was not inserted into the Charter or the Court Procedures Act, which related to the operation of the Court. While this was not necessarily done on purpose, it does provide valuable context on the jurisdiction that it limits, that being that of the Election Commission, rather than that of the Court. II
While hardly as glamorous or as controversial as other cases considered by this Court, the issue of the general prerogative and what limits it may have is perhaps more important than most of those other cases, since it relates to the very core of the judicial function. This case is made even more important by the fact that it relates to the conduction of elections, a more fundamental aspect of the democratic order in the region, and a cornerstone of its culture and identity.
A case was made in previous sections that Article 1, Section 5 of the Elections Act does not preclude the Court from directly hearing disputes regarding the conduction of elections. Instead, what Section 5 indicates is that any dispute submitted to the Election Commission, should it be of a legal nature, must be referred to the Court. It is the belief of the Court that this is so, and therefore it should be fully empowered to hear the additional question posed by Sandaoguo in his initial statement. In so deciding, however, there is also an additional consideration, that being the third clause of Section 5: “Commissioners will not finalize any election until all disputes have been settled.” A legal question dealing with an election law matter is not automatically an election dispute. It may relate to election law itself, rather than with the aspects of a particular election, in which case any ongoing elections ought to be allowed to continue. It would be different if the legal question originated as a dispute that was referred to the Court by the Election Commission, since it would then be directly linked to the ongoing election, rendering it unable to continue until such a time as the Court decides on the issue, clarifying a piece of legislation that would be directly impacting the conduction of the election. Few rights are as precious to a democracy as the right to vote. Elections require not only openness and participation, but also clarity and predictability in their legal framework. It is the duty of the High Court to hear all such questions, should they be justiciable, so that this clarity can be ensured. It is the belief of the Court that the Charter and the Elections Act support this view by requiring the Election Commission to limit its jurisdiction to issues of a non-legal nature, leaving to the Court what is and ought to be its natural and exclusive jurisdiction. It is so ordered. Former Delegate of the South Pacific
Posts outside High Court venues should be taken as those of any other legislator. I do not participate in the regional server, but I am happy to talk through instant messaging or on the forum. Legal Resources: THE MATT-DUCK Law Archive | Mavenu Diplomatic Archive | Rules of the High Court | Case Submission System | Online Rulings Consultation System
In light of this ruling, I would like to notify the court that I will not be withdrawing my original first question from this venue. I would like the High Court to rule on it.
HIGH COURT OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC
DETERMINATION OF JUSTICIABILITY Whereas sandaoguo has requested this Court that a review be conducted on certain issues related to the interpretation of the law with the following question:
In the forum round of a Delegate election, is the Election Commission legally required to conduct a full vote count under instant-runoff voting (IRV)?
Whereas this Court has conducted a careful review of the merits of such a request on the basis of its legal necessity and potential to impact present and future policies.
It is resolved with respect to this Legal Question as follows:
Kris Kringle Permanent Justice Former Delegate of the South Pacific
Posts outside High Court venues should be taken as those of any other legislator. I do not participate in the regional server, but I am happy to talk through instant messaging or on the forum. Legal Resources: THE MATT-DUCK Law Archive | Mavenu Diplomatic Archive | Rules of the High Court | Case Submission System | Online Rulings Consultation System
For Immediate Release
25 March 2018 The Court provides notice to the general public that the ruling on HCLQ1802: Delegate Voting Counting Methodology will be released on 26 March 2018 at 12:00 EST. The Court will thereafter entertain questions and doubts regarding the legal reasoning expressed in its ruling, and the process it followed in the consideration of the legal question, but it will not consider questions regarding the political ramifications of the same, nor will it express opinions of a political nature on any other unrelated subject. Former Delegate of the South Pacific
Posts outside High Court venues should be taken as those of any other legislator. I do not participate in the regional server, but I am happy to talk through instant messaging or on the forum. Legal Resources: THE MATT-DUCK Law Archive | Mavenu Diplomatic Archive | Rules of the High Court | Case Submission System | Online Rulings Consultation System
HIGH COURT OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC
- HCLQ1802 - DELEGATE VOTING COUNTING METHODOLOGY In the forum round of a Delegate election, is the Election Commission legally required to conduct a full vote count under instant-runoff voting (IRV)? 26 MARCH 2018 Justice KRINGLE delivered the Opinion.
Summary of the Opinion It is the opinion of the Court that Method A, as described by Sandaoguo in his petition, is the closest possible implementation of the Elections Act that conforms to a reasonable interpretation of the same. This involves a constant reallocation of the votes until one candidate holds an absolute majority, and only one additional candidate remains. These two remaining candidates would then proceed to the second round of voting, held gameside through a regional poll.
While some cases before the Court have a high profile, others are more technical in nature, and deal with the minutiae and specifics of how the less glamorous aspects of our laws are to be interpreted. This is one such case: a situation where an ambiguity in the description of an electoral process has led to a need for the interpretation of the way in which the Delegate of the South Pacific is to be elected. In deciding this case, the Court will follow its practice of balancing the letter of the law, a measure of the common understanding of electoral systems and the customary implementation of the law in question by the Electoral Commission, to reach an interpretation that is both consistent with the law, yet also reasonably able to be implemented by the proper institutions during future elections.
I
A. Language of the Elections Act
Any interpretation must first consider what the law says, and whether a simple and direct interpretation is possible. In this case, the Court must refer to Articles 2 and 3 of the Elections Act. These articles explain, respectively, details of the voting methodology to be used for all elections, and the particular process to be employed for the election of the Delegate. Article 2 declares that elections held on the forum must be conducted through the use of a variant of Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), wherein “voters may vote for one or multiple candidates in descending order of preference”. This contemplates a single winner, and indicates that, in the event that no candidate should have an absolute majority, “the candidate with the least number of votes shall be eliminated” and their votes “will be reallocated based on the expressed preferences (…) until a candidate has an absolute majority”. This language naturally presumes that an election must have a single winner, something that comes into conflict with the requirements of Article 3, which indicates that “the two candidates ranked first and second under IRV will move to a second round of voting”. Since IRV considers a single possible winner, the ambiguity, perhaps even contradiction, subject of this legal question is the way in which such an assumption would work with the requirement that there be two winners for the initial round of an election for Delegate. B. Historical Implementation There is merit in a closer examination of how Articles 2 and 3 of the Elections Act have been implemented in prior Delegate elections, since the current system was adopted. Since July 2016 there have been four Delegate elections, the most recent three having been held with more than 2 candidates. In spite of the existence of records on result announcements, it has been difficult for the Court to ascertain with a degree of confidence the exact way in which the Election Commission interpreted and implemented the Elections Act. As can be seen in the results announcements for the January 2017, July 2017 and January 2018 Elections, Commissioner Feirmont provided very limited explanations of the procedures he followed to count votes. It would seem, based on a brief examination of the aforementioned explanations, that the Commission employed an erratic approach for each election. For the January 2017 Election, the Commission reallocated votes with a clear intention of ending with only two candidates, who would then have been declared winners of the first round. When this failed and two candidates were tied for the place of second winner, the Commission considered the second preference votes for these candidates. It is unclear if the criterion for this was which candidate had more second preference votes, or which candidate had a majority of second preference votes. For the July 2017 Election, the Commission held a single round of counting, in which the two candidates with the highest number of first preferences were declared the winners. It is worth mentioning that Seraph obtained an absolute majority of first preferences, whereas Drugged Monkeys obtained less than 30% of all first preferences. It is unclear what the Commission considered should be done with the votes of the Sam111, who was the remaining candidate in the election. For the January 2018, the Commission held three rounds of counting, reallocating votes until only three candidates remain. At that point, Seraph and Tsunamy were declared the winners, yet neither had an absolute majority of first preferences. It is again unclear what criteria the Commission followed to count votes, or whether this methodology properly followed the stipulations of the Elections Act. It must be clarified that the Court is not passing judgement on the adequacy or legitimacy of prior Delegate elections. In that regard, the Court is merely offering remarks on the usefulness of prior elections, as counted by the Election Commission, as precedent for the customary interpretation of the Elections Act, since said interpretation appears to have been erratic and unclear, and therefore does not offer a complete view of how the law was seen by those tasked with implementing it. II
As part of its research process, the Court considered various sources in addition to the ones already mentioned in prior sections. It considered the amicus curiae briefs that were submitted, reviewed external sources on the Instant Runoff Voting system and consulted with third parties knowledgeable on electoral systems. To paraphrase Obi Wan Kenobi, the idea is to go up, not down, a goal that is not served well by lacking in proper research. In short, then, an effort was made to obtain a clear understanding of how the system is meant to work, and how it could plausibly work.
There are some basic principles to Instant Runoff Voting, particularly regarding to the variant outlined in Article 2 of the Elections Act. One such principle is that there must be a single winner. Obviously that expectation cannot be met for Delegate elections. A second principle is that votes must be transferable, so that the vote cast by a legislator will not be easily discarded if their primary choice is not viable. This principle must be upheld, lest an election be in practice a different system, more akin to First Past the Post, a system that is not allowed by the Elections Act. It is the belief of the Court that the most sensible interpretation of the Elections Act would be that in which votes are reallocated, as dictated by Instant Runoff Voting, until only two candidates remain, one of whom will necessarily hold a majority of the vote. This is consistent with the method described by Sandaoguo as Method A, and prefers the transferable nature of the votes, one of the key features of Instant Runoff Voting, while also ensuring that at least one of the candidates holds an absolute majority, as required by the Elections Act. It is so ordered. Former Delegate of the South Pacific
Posts outside High Court venues should be taken as those of any other legislator. I do not participate in the regional server, but I am happy to talk through instant messaging or on the forum. Legal Resources: THE MATT-DUCK Law Archive | Mavenu Diplomatic Archive | Rules of the High Court | Case Submission System | Online Rulings Consultation System |
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