I've been thinking lately about ways to make our permanent offices more responsive to public concerns and also give people greater confidence in their internal workings. Right now, once appointed and confirmed a CRS member, Justice, LegComm member, or General holds office in perpetuity, essentially unless their inactivity hits a point of obviously compromising the function of their institution or in the event of some kind of scandal. Recall is a good accountability mechanism, but these officials are sitting there with both job responsibilities and power and are not really subject to any kind of meaningful oversight or needing to report back to the public.

My proposal is that once a year on a relatively arbitrary date (say: May 1), all permanent appointees will be subject to a "reconfirmation vote" by the Assembly. People can vote "yes" or "no" and if more than 50%+1 votes to keep someone, they keep their position. If less than 50% votes to keep someone, they lose their position unless they're reappointed and then reconfirmed. It's not a super complicated system. Just an annual check in on "does the Assembly still have confidence in this person's ability to do their job?"

From my perspective, there's not a lot of downsides. It requires a bit of administrative overhead, but by running all votes on the same date once a year (instead of one year from appointment date), that is heavily mitigated. Arguably, it overly politicizes the positions. From my perspective, there are two answers to that: (1) recalls already present a risk of overly politicizing a given position/issue, arguably moreso, and (2) if an official cannot carry support of a majority of the Assembly, they simply aren't maintaining the trust of the public to a sufficient extent to keep their job. And, really, how much should we trust a LegComm member to make important decisions about admitting new Legislators if a majority of the current ones don't trust them? If a General can't convince a majority of the Assembly that they're still active in SPSF administration, should they really retain their commission? If a CRS member doesn't have the trust of half of the Assembly, can they really command respect in a crisis situation?

Meanwhile, there's considerable upside. It creates a natural, gradual, and less adversarial accountability system for our appointed officials and results in more engagement and communication with these institutions which are otherwise often somewhat hidden from view. When officials pass these votes (which I imagine will be far more common than officials not passing them), then it'll be a clear show of continued trust in them by the Assembly, which enhances their perceived authority and confidence in conducting their functions.

Thoughts?