Your Honor, and may it please the Court,

I am filing this brief on behalf of my own office as Intelligence Coordinator of the Council on Regional Security, in response to Part II of Appellant’s August 15 brief. I will respond in equal parts to sub-sections A and B of the brief.

I. Response to Sub-Part A

A. Appellant is making elementary errors of statutory construction

Appellant argues that the Cabinet must “provide an explanation of the classification system in place and how it was applied to each piece of purportedly classified evidence,” lest the Appellant be denied fair justice to defend themselves against their duly-ordered proscription. In doing so, Appellant makes elementary errors in statutory construction, and ignores the legislative history of the office of the Intelligence Coordinator.

Article IX, Section 13 of the Charter states:

Quote:13. The Council on Regional Security shall designate an individual as Intelligence Coordinator, who must be notified of and approve all intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. The Intelligence Coordinator will be responsible for disseminating any and all intelligence to the Council on Regional Security and other bodies as needed. The Intelligence Coordinator and the Minister of Military Affairs will maintain a regional intelligence classification system, as necessary for the ensuring information security.

Appellant is incorrect when they state “any designation of intelligence as classified must … be necessary for information security.” This is a basic error of statutory construction, with Appellant also altering the wording of the law to better fit their end goal. The law states that the government will maintain a classification system, “as necessary for the ensuring information security” (sic). This is not the same meaning as saying the government will maintain a classification system, and any classification must only be made when it is necessary for information security. The meaning of “as necessary” when used in a future tense sentence means “as the need may arise.”

So, the law is saying that the Intelligence Coordinator and the Minister of Military Affairs will maintain a classification system, as the need arises for one in order to ensure information security. This is a far cry from the supposed legal requirement that intelligence be classified “only as necessary for ensuring information security.” The clause applies solely to the creation of a classification system, not as an individualized criterion when deciding which intelligence deserves classification. By default, any mission approved by the Intelligence Coordinator is classified. That is what intelligence is—if it is not classified, then it’s not intelligence. It’s just public information. Appellant is simply on a fishing expedition to get the Court to force the declassification of sensitive intelligence, in the hopes that they can find and close whatever avenues TSP’s intelligence operations have in acquiring intelligence on them.

Furthermore, Appellant erroneously creates a legislative history that does not exist. The Assembly did not pass and subsequently amend Section 13 to add language “in the interests of transparency and open government.” In fact, the legislative history shows just the opposite. The office of the Intelligence Coordinator was created in response to a lack of organization and security operations (sec-ops, as it is commonly called) under inadequate constitutional language. The creation of the Intelligence Coordinator was rooted in idea that “the more people who know … the harder it is to keep secret.” (http://tspforums.xyz/thread-4954-post-15...#pid151378) The subsequent amendment about the creation of a classification system was borne from my own frustration with there being no clear guidance on who decides levels of classification, not a frustration our intelligence organization wasn’t transparent enough.

B. The Cabinet has no role in security intelligence operations

Appellant demands that the Cabinet produce an “explanation of the classification system in place.” This is an improper request that the Cabinet cannot possibly fulfill. Intelligence in TSP is separated into two spheres: military intelligence on basic raiding/defending missions, and the much broader world of security intelligence. The Cabinet’s role in the first is limited to whatever system the Minister of Military Affairs has created and is nonexistent in the second. Security intelligence is the purview of the Council on Regional Security, specifically the Intelligence Coordinator. That is the delineation of TSP’s classification system agreed to subsequent to the passing of the relevant amendment.

The classification system using by the Intelligence Coordinator is not publicly documented, as it is part of our tradecraft. Speaking in generalizations, all intelligence produced by a duly-approved mission is classified by default for the eyes of the Intelligence Coordinator only. Intelligence is then disseminated to others as the Intelligence Coordinator deems necessary, as authorized by Section 13. In this instance, the intelligence operation related to the Appellant was approved, and the intelligence it delivered has been classified appropriately for an ongoing mission. It has been disseminated to the Prime Minister and the bench of the High Court. As an ongoing intelligence mission, public dissemination could imperil our information avenue, and broad dissemination is not yet ripe. This is my official finding as the Intelligence Coordinator of the Council on Regional Security. I have cooperated with the Court, with the understanding that the intelligence would not be improperly revealed.

II. Response to Sub-Part B

Appellant argues that Appellant’s counsel should be allowed to review the intelligence, that the intelligence must be published in redacted form, or else must be “considered inadmissible and not considered.” These are unreasonable requests and Appellant mistakes this hearing for a criminal trial.

The Court has been supplied with the intelligence for in camera review, in unredacted form. The redacted form of the intelligence, pursuant to the requirement that information that may harm regional security must be redacted, would be a black page. The intelligence is from an ongoing mission, and by definition that mission would be imperiled by granting Appellant access to any form of the intelligence. The Court can make this determination with ease, and it would be challenging for it to argue how the intelligence may be given in any form to the Appellant without endangering the integrity of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. Again, I must ring the alarm bell that Appellant is on a fishing expedition to uncover the avenues of intelligence used to obtain the evidence the proscription is based upon. If for procedural fidelity Appellant continues to demand a redacted copy of the intelligence, and the Court agrees, I will be obliged to do so of course. But I do not imagine the copy would be illuminating.

Furthermore, Appellant erroneously is treating this proceeding as a criminal trial. The Court cannot declare “evidence” in any way “inadmissible,” because this is an appeal of the Cabinet’s determination of hostility. The Court is an inquisitive, not adversarial, body and thus it is Court’s duty to review the determination of hostility. It is not the Appellant’s role to play defendant, nor to use American-style criminal trial procedures to transform this appeal into a trial with cross-examination.

If the Proscription Act intended trial procedures, it would say so. What it provides for instead is a judicial review, wherein the Court analyzes the veracity of the evidence and either says the evidence supports a conclusion of hostility or that it does not. Importantly, what the Proscription Act does not intend is for the Court to replace the Cabinet’s determination of the severity of hostility with the Justices’ own opinions. The question asked in this appeal is: did the Cabinet proscribe Ever-Wandering Souls based on evidence that shows, at minimum, they performed an act within Article 1? The Proscription Act does not place the Court in the role of an issuing authority, but merely a reviewing body to ensure that proscriptions are based on evidence and not simply the prejudices of politics.