Bruuma and the Serevan War, a first analysis: part II, politics


A senior member of the Workers' Mojo Party addresses the crowd at a gathering in Bayougrad.

The decision of the regime to get involved in the Serevan disturbances and actually help escalate it to a civil war is difficult to read in. It is possible that they believed they could use the presence of their troops (or their pulling back) as a bargain chip with Erinor or the international community. If that was the case, they underestimated the reactions abroad, in particular the Ryccian one, which in turned made the events precipitate.
 
After failing to capture the whole island, it is doubtful that the regime really believed they could win the war on the battlefield, even if they did not probably expected the military mobilizations from Frost and GI-Land too. Bruuma probably conducted the rest of the war trying to gain as much leverage possible before being forced to propose a deal. The push to Ramica, in the final phase of the war, makes more sense if one thinks of it as a mean to held the city “hostage” to pressure Erinor in accepting to negotiate.
 
Regarding its objectives of foreign policy, apparently Bruuma did not achieve anyone. It did not obtain any concession on its nuclear program, which instead will probably be even more opposed. Sereva did not gain independence as socialist country and the Bafuto Serevai have no real perspective of achieving any electoral victory now that they are a political party. The war deteriorated the relationship with many countries, including the neighboring GI-Land and Erinor itself, with whom Bruuma had enjoyed a mildly warm relationship until that point.
 
However, a closer look reveals that the country did achieve some gains. It neutralized the possibility of an hostile power establishing a presence on Sereva – although not in Erinor. It ensured the survival of the Bafuto Serevai and their presence as a closely-aligned party in the Erinoran political landscape. Most countries have accepted to resume diplomatic and trade relations. The role of Bruuman as a regional power has become more defined.
 
There is also another vital aspect to consider: that of internal politics. For the primary objective of the Bruuman regime, which is its own perpetuation, the war has been a boon: it has provided a formidable instrument to rally consensus and strengthen its grip on the population for the present and the future. Lowering the population standard of living, losing almost ten thousand men on foreign soil seems unbearable only if looked through the eyes of a democracy: for a totalitarian regime they are a readily payable price for a universal justification for anything. The war has given the population foreign enemies toward whom direct the anger, a menace that further justify the perpetuation of the regime and a new purpose for sacrifices and hardships.
 
Also, some point out that the war has been a giant playground to test the BPDF effectiveness of today so to know how to update it against future threats.  A cynical view that however wouldn’t be surprising at all for the regime.
 
That is not to say that the war did not had any cost for the Bruuman leadership. The economy suffered enough from sanctions and trade disruption to make another similar venture unfeasible, which is true also for the material losses in which the BPDF incurred.  
 
The survival of a totalitarian dictatorship depends on its ability to adapt to external and internal changings that it cannot prevent. The Serevan War has been Bruuma’s lastest shot at it: only time will tell how much successful.