Right so, let's get this out of the way. This is a tentative draft for now, and I'll make a pass back soon to tidy the language up;

The Charter of the Coalition of the South Pacific

[...]

VI. THE EXECUTIVE

Establishing an executive branch consisting of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

(1) The Prime Minister will be the head of government and the leader of the Cabinet. They will be responsible for the overall direction and coordination of executive activities, being a liaison between the government and the community, and protecting the Coalition.

(2) The Cabinet will consist of ministers with the following portfolios: Foreign Affairs, Culture, Engagement, and Defense appointed by the Prime Minister with due discretion, tasked to maintain the effective function of the Executive, including the management of foreign affairs, management of the official military, management of World Assembly affairs, facilitation of regional culture and roleplay, and integration of new players into the Coalition's government and community.

(3)The Prime Minister shall be primarily responsible for establishing the government’s foreign policy program, communicating with allies, and coordinating with the military on foreign policy priorities when necessary, with the aid of a Minister of Foreign Affairs and other deputies if deemed necessary. The Prime Minister shall hold sole authority to initiate treaty negotiations with other regions, groups and organizations, but may designate officers to handle those negotiations. Upon completion of a treaty negotiation, the Prime Minister or the designated official must present it to the Assembly for ratification.

(4) As leader of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister is responsible for overseeing a collective single, united Cabinet agenda, and may shall give directions and instructions to the ministers to ensure consistency with the stated agenda. Disputes within the Cabinet are subject to the majority decision and collective responsibility; where there is no majority the Prime Minister’s vote shall be the deciding one arbitration of the Prime Minister, with necessary consultation from relevant deputies and advisors.

(4) The Office of World Assembly Legislation will be a permanent executive office, which will be led by a Director, responsible for coordinating the Coalition's activities in the World Assembly, providing assistance in drafting resolutions, and issuing voting recommendations on World Assembly proposals. At the start of each Cabinet term, the Director will be appointed by the Prime Minister for a term coinciding with the Cabinet's. In any vacancy, a new Director will be appointed by the Prime Minister to serve the remainder of the term.

(5) (4) Members of the Executive are required to hold legislator status.

Elections

(6) (5) Executive Prime Minister elections will be held every four months, where the Prime Minister and all Cabinet positions will be up for election.

(7) (6) The date, time, and manner of elections and appointment will be set by the Assembly in a law.

Minister of Culture

(8) The Minister of Culture will be responsible for supporting the roleplay community and organizing regional cultural activities, events, and exchanges.

Minister of Engagement

(9) The Minister of Engagement will be responsible for recruiting and integrating new players into the Coalition's government and community, maintaining public infrastructure such as dispatches and other guides, setting unified presentation standards, and providing graphics to the government and citizens of the Coalition.

Minister of Foreign Affairs

(10) The Minister of Foreign Affairs will be the Coalition’s chief diplomat. They will be responsible for establishing the government’s foreign policy program, communicating with allies, and coordinating with the military on foreign policy priorities when necessary.

(11) The Minister of Foreign Affairs holds the sole power to initiate treaty negotiations with other regions, groups, and organizations, but may designate officers to handle those negotiations. Upon completion of a treaty negotiation, the Minister must present it to the full executive for majority approval, before submitting it to the Assembly for ratification.

(12) The Minister of Foreign Affairs will be responsible for establishing standards for the creation and maintenance of consulates and embassies.

Minister of Defense

(13) The Minister of Defense will be the civilian leader of the armed forces of the Coalition, the South Pacific Special Forces. In conjunction with a group of Generals, the Minister of Defense will be responsible for the defense of the Coalition, building military activity, and conducting military operations.

(14) The Minister of Defense may elect to establish an intelligence office, in equal coordination with the Council on Regional Security.

Executive Authorities

(15) (7) The executive Prime Minister may exercise the collective authority of executive orders, by unanimous consent among the Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers. Executive orders may only be issued to address an immediate and pressing issue created by ambiguity or holes in a particular law, which will immediately have the effect of law.

(16) (8) Upon declaring an executive order, the order will be presented automatically to the Assembly for three days of debate, followed by a vote according to legislative rules, where it will expire and its effects shall be reversed if the Assembly does not incorporate it into law.

(17) (9) The Prime Minister, Cabinet ministers, and other executive offices may elect to appoint deputies and advisors, who will be considered junior members of their respective offices, but will not have voting rights in any executive decision.

[...]

X. THE MILITARY

Creating an official military for the purposes of regional defense, war, and gameplay.

(1) The South Pacific Special Forces will be the official military forces of the Coalition. Their responsibilities will be to enact the government’s military policies abroad, foster activity for the region, and serve as a representative of the Coalition’s power and influence.

(2) The military will be led by the Prime Minister of Defense or an appointed minister, along with a corps of generals appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Assembly. The [add-bill]Prime[/add-bill] Minister and general corps may establish further hierarchy, create programs, and appoint deputies as they see necessary.

(3) The military will have the support of the Coalition in conducting operations to protect innocent regions from attack and oppression and promote legitimate, native democratic institutions across the world. The military may not colonize or annex any region without the express permission of the Cabinet and the Assembly, by majority vote of both chambers. Nor may the military attack, subjugate, purge, destroy, or vandalize any regions, excepting those regions which espouse hateful ideologies and those regions against which the Coalition has declared an official state of war.

(4) The Prime Minister of Defense will coordinate with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to ensure that no military activities harm the government’s diplomatic affairs or public relations.

[...]

Elections Act

[...]

Offices of the Cabinet

(1) On the first of every February, June and October, the Assembly will convene to elect the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
a. After the first 4 days of the election period, during which legislators may declare their candidacy and campaign for only one the position, and a campaign-only period of two days, where candidates may campaign and the Assembly will debate the merits of their platforms, the Assembly will vote for 3 days.
b. For each the position of Prime Minister, the respective winner, as decided using Instant-Runoff Voting, will be declared the Prime Minister-elect by the Election Commissioner.

(2) The terms for the incoming Prime Minister and appointed Cabinet ministers, who shall be appointed to their portfolios by the Prime Minister before the commencement of the term, will begin the week after elections. Before this inauguration, any and all election-related disputes must be settled. The outgoing Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers will maintain their offices until then.

[...]

6. Vacancies of Office

(1) A special election will be held for vacancies arising within the Cabinet, if at least half of the term remains. If less than half of the term remains, or the position is vacant due to nobody running in its election, the Cabinet may appoint a replacement until the next regularly scheduled election. For vacancies arising within the Cabinet, the Prime Minister shall appoint a replacement to serve the remainder of the term.

[...]

 

Legislator Committe Act

[...]

1. Scope

(1) The Legislator Committee is the commission responsible for granting and revoking legislator status to members.

(2) The Legislator Committee comprises no less than three and no more than five legislators that have each been appointed by the Cabinet Prime Minister and approved by the Assembly via a simple majority vote.

(3) A member of the Legislator Committee is removed from the committee if
a. the member resigns,
b. the member loses legislator eligibility, or
c. the member is recalled by the Assembly through regular order.

(4) If there is no member of the Legislator Committee available due to vacancy or leave, and there are outstanding duties to be performed, the Cabinet Prime Minister may appoint an emergency member to handle any urgent matters of the committee. The Council on Regional Security may, on security grounds only, rescind the Cabinet's Prime Minister’s appointment. The emergency member's tenure will last until the Cabinet Prime Minister rescinds the appointment or until one week after a regular committee member is available, whichever happens sooner.

[...]

 

World Assembly Act
An act to define the World Assembly procedures of the Coalition of the South Pacific

1. Powers

(1) The Delegate shall cast their vote on proposed World Assembly resolutions according to voting recommendations issued by the Office of World Assembly Legislation, except under circumstances in which the Office issued a recommendation for the Delegate to abstain from voting. If the Office's recommendation is contrary to the vote of all World Assembly nations in the South Pacific, the Delegate may choose to change their vote in collaboration with the Office.

(2) In the absence of a recommendation, the Delegate shall consult with Cabinet to determine which direction to vote in. If the direction is contrary to the vote of all World Assembly nations in the South Pacific, the Delegate may choose to change their vote in collaboration with the Cabinet..

(3) The Cabinet may override a vote on a World Assembly resolution for security and diplomatic purposes.

2. Approval voting

(1) The Delegate may give an approval vote on proposed World Assembly resolutions freely or based on the instruction of the Office of World Assembly Legislation.

(2) The South Pacific Special Forces are prohibited from engaging in approval raiding, except as prescribed in the Charter.

3. Voting

(1) The Office of World Assembly Legislation shall determine the medium for voting on proposed World Assembly resolutions.

(2) Nations of the South Pacific that are World Assembly members or members of the South Pacific Special Forces may not be barred from eligibility in having their votes counted.

(3) If a nation resigns from the World Assembly or their membership in the South Pacific Special Forces before the voting period ends, their vote shall not count.

4. Legal Impact of Security Council Declarations

(1) "Security Council" is an official organ of the World Assembly, to which the Delegate serves as the South Pacific’s representative.

(2) "Declaration" is an official resolution adopted by the Security Council that attempts to express the will of the Security Council on any issue under its jurisdiction.

(3) No declaration adopted by the Security Council will be recognized, abided by, or considered law by the South Pacific, unless sent to the Assembly by the Cabinet and ratified by a majority vote of the Assembly.

(4) No vote cast by the Delegate on a declaration of the Security Council will be considered implicit or explicit approval or disapproval of the declaration by the South Pacific itself.

 

Treaties Act

An act defining the Cabinet’s treaty powers

1. Assembly Ratification

(1) Upon the receipt of a treaty by the Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs or any designated official, the Assembly will debate the proposed treaty for at least five days before any vote is held.

(2) Amendments to existing treaties must be ratified under the same protocols as original treaties.

2. Treaty Dissolution and Repeal

(1) A treaty will be dissolved if the Cabinet Prime Minister reports to the Assembly that a signatory to the treaty has violated its terms. The dissolution report must include detailed evidence, which will be up for a commenting period in the Assembly for one week before the dissolution is legally binding.

(2) If a signatory to a treaty notifies the Cabinet Prime Minister that they have dissolved the treaty on their end, the Cabinet Prime Minister will swiftly notify the Assembly. The treaty will be dissolved automatically upon Assembly notification.

(3) Should the Cabinet Prime Minister wish to dissolve a treaty for reasons other than the violation of its terms, they must notify the Assembly. The Assembly will debate for at least five days, and then vote on its repeal. Should a vote on its repeal pass with majority support, the treaty will be dissolved officially, and the signatory notified promptly.

[...]

 

Proscription Act

[...]

3. Grant of Authority

(1) The Cabinet Prime Minister or the Council on Regional Security may proscribe an individual that is not a member of the Coalition, or a foreign region or organization, that they determine to be hostile. The Cabinet Prime Minister together with the Council on Regional Security may proscribe a member or a group of members that they determine to be hostile.

[...]

 

Military Code
An act establishing the rules and regulations of military forces

1. General Corps

(1) The General Corps is a commission comprising up to three Commanders and the Minister of Defense. A Commander on the General Corps shall be called a General.

(2) The General Corps shall be the supreme entity leading the military, hold responsibility for the planning and overseeing all missions of the military, decide all personnel matters including applications and promotions, and handle disciplinary actions as a tribunal.

(3) In case of a vacancy on the General Corps, the Minister of Defense may appoint a Commander with approval by the Assembly to become a General. Should there be no Generals, the military shall not operate except for the self-defense of the South Pacific, for the defense of an ally, or for the purposes of explicit treaty obligations.

(4) A General is removed from the General Corps if
a. the General no longer holds the rank of Commander (temporary demotions shall not be considered for this purpose),
b. a simple majority of the General Corps votes for the removal, or
c. the General is recalled by the Assembly through regular order.

2. Ranks

(1) The attainable ranks in the military are, from lowest to highest:
a. Trainee, which is the entry rank for any new member of the military, regardless of prior experience;
b. Soldier, which is the rank for which a member of the military is considered to be able to autonomously follow any order described in battlefield-typical terms;
c. Officer, which is for individuals deemed capable of leading troops in operations;
d. Commander, which is considered the rank that can plan and execute larger, potentially long-term operations.

(2) The General Corps may introduce specialized ranks within the main ranks at its discretion.

(3) The General Corps shall define rank requirements for each rank, which must be viewable by any member of the military. The requirements must include objective criteria based on operations performed by the individual in the name of this military, as well as subjective criteria based on the General Corps's judgement of the individual's character as it relates to the specific rank to be attained.

(4) For the rank requirements for Commanders, the General Corps must include criteria that require state-of-the-art skills and knowledge required for liberating a large game-created region.

(5) When rank requirements are changed such that there are members of the military that no longer qualify for their current rank, the General Corps must grant a reasonable grace time for affected members to meet these new requirements before they are demoted.

3. Rules

(1) A member of the military must show respectful behavior towards a superior, must not bully, humiliate, or intimidate their subordinates, and must not act in an unbecoming manner toward their peers.

(2) A member of the military may not intentionally or recklessly disobey a lawful command given by a superior, or intentionally or recklessly put at risk, delay, or otherwise disrupt a lawful operation.

(3) A member of the military may only be a member of another military with assent of the General Corps, which it may rescind at any time and for any reason. If the member's other military is on the opposing side of an arbitrary R/D conflict, the member may not change sides for the duration of the operation, and shall be considered suspended from the military for the duration of the operation should they be engaged on the opposing side.

(4) A member of the military must not aid the enemy. A member who is also a member of another military and engaged alongside that military on the opposing side during an arbitrary R/D conflict shall not be considered in conflict of this rule.

(5) A member of the military may not obtain or attempt to obtain confidential information with the intent to disclose it to individuals or organizations not authorized to possess it.

(6) A member of the military is required to perform at least one mission every calendar month, unless suspended or granted leave by the General Corps.

(7) The General Corps may instate additional rules that do not contradict rules stated here at its discretion. These rules must be publicly visible.

4. Disciplinary Actions

(1) The General Corps is responsible for determining whether a member of the military has conducted themselves in a way not befitting their rank or not befitting their membership in the military. Upon making such a determination, the General Corps will issue one or more disciplinary actions as appropriate, keeping in mind the severity of the infraction and the individual's disciplinary history.

(2) A disciplinary action given to a member of the military can be any one of:
a. Temporary demotion, in which the affected member must serve under a lower effective rank for a duration of up to one month;
b. Indefinite demotion, in which the affected member's effective rank is indefinitely lowered by virtue of no longer meeting rank requirements;
c. Suspension, in which the affected member may not serve the military for a duration of up to one month;
d. Honorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty in good faith;
e. Dishonorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty and not permitted to return without special assent of the Assembly.

(3) A member of the military subject to a disciplinary action may appeal that disciplinary action and offer a defense to be reviewed by the General Corps. If an amicable resolution cannot be achieved, the member may demand that the charge be brought to the High Court. In this case, the court shall conduct a trial akin to a criminal trial, in which General Corps shall act as the Complainant, the accused member as the Accused, and the disciplinary actions listed herein shall be used by the court for sentencing.

 

Judicial Act

[...]

1. The High Court

(1) The High Court comprises a Chief Justice and at least two Associate Justices.

(2) The Chief Justice operates the High Court. In case of vacancy, absence, or recusal, the Associate Justices shall collectively operate the High Court.

(3) The Chief Justice may order the recusal of any associate justice on a specific issue. The Associate Justices may collectively force the recusal of the Chief Justice on a specific issue.

(4) In case of a vacancy, a willing and eligible Associate Justice will be selected by their peers to serve as Chief Justice.

(5) To appoint an Associate Justice, the Cabinet Prime Minister will consult with the High Court and present a willing and eligible individual to the Assembly for an approval vote.

(6) The Cabinet Prime Minister is compelled to appoint a fitting individual as per above with all deliberate speed if
a. there are less than two Associate Justices on the High Court,
b. the Chief Justice position is vacant and the Associate Justices cannot determine a new Chief Justice amongst themselves for any reason, or
c. a case cannot continue due to recusals.

[...]

I think we've exhausted basically everything about this topic already, so I would like to focus on addressing specific concerns people might have about this, instead of the usual 'lay out your reasoning right out of the gate' method we so frequently use here. I'm happy to speak out why I think this would be a good change for us, but I think my thoughts on the matter are rather well-known and I would prefer to have some different perspectives in here for/against this proposal.

(This post was last modified: 07-19-2022, 01:21 AM by Moon.)

Reply

If you're going to do an appointment-based system, the cabinet portfolios should not be fixed. Also, the notion of the Cabinet being a collective organization led by the Prime Minister that conducts votes on executive policy rather than policy just being decided by the Prime Minister should also go is Ministers are to be appointed.

Spoiler

Republic of Lansoon (Pacifica)

Reply

I support the general idea but there are a few specifics I'd like to point out.

I agree with Cornfeed on the fact that Ministries should not be fixed. Instead it can be part of candidate campaigns. Sketched demonstration: ''I see an issue or something lacking in The Coalition - This is my general goal and agenda - These are policies which will help me achieve the agenda - For successful implementation of these policies, I see these Ministries as being desirable to have - This Ministry will be assigned for working on these specific policies''. However, I do believe that two Ministries MUST exist as fixed, given the game mechanics: Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As for appointment of specific Ministers, I believe that should be left after the election has concluded. It is up to the elected Prime Minister to appoint who they think would help them reach the goal. I believe that this would give a certain weight of responsibility to the Prime Minister.
On the topic of responsibility, I believe that the Prime Minister should be held accountable to the Assembly. Besides motioning a vote of no confidence (which is an extreme case), perhaps codifying an obligation of the Prime Minister (or his appointed subsidiary) to present ''briefings'' to the Assembly on a regular basis. These briefings would detail what has been done, what is being worked on and what is being planned within the Cabinet in the aims of reaching the agenda set out in the Prime Minister's campaign. As for Ministers, they are held accountable by the Prime Minister who has appointed them and as such he has the right to dismiss them from that position, providing they give out a statement detailing the reasons for doing so.

Setting the agenda in the campaign would make them more substantial and would provide a good set of standards which both the Assembly and the Prime Minister could judge that specific term by. If the agenda isn't met, the term is judged poorly. However, it also provides a discussion on why the agenda wasn't reached. If the reasons prove to be of systemic nature, it further incentivizes a natural development of The Coalition towards efficiency.

The Orange Records | Viliakmon (Pacifica) | NationStates Account Main | Discord: genericsequencealias#0990

Reply

However, I do believe that two Ministries MUST exist as fixed, given the game mechanics: Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Rather than codifying specific ministries, I wonder whether we should instead codify specific responsibilities (related to game mechanics) that the Prime Minister or a duly appointed minister must fulfil. The constitutional law therefore becomes a sort of "minimum viable product" of what duties must be carried out, with prospective PMs then free to fill the rest of their agenda as they see fit.

Reply

I would be interested in seeing a discussion -for and against- the possibility of Assembly confirmation of ministers.

Former Delegate of the South Pacific
Posts outside High Court venues should be taken as those of any other legislator.
I do not participate in the regional server, but I am happy to talk through instant messaging or on the forum.

Legal Resources:
THE MATT-DUCK Law Archive | Mavenu Diplomatic Archive | Rules of the High Court | Case Submission System | Online Rulings Consultation System

Reply

Not having stable ministries would imply that their members must change positions regularly, which risks causing disengagement.

And doesn't the possibility that new ministries appear without their function being governed by the charter risk destabilizing the cabinet?

About the proposal, the prime minister has more power by appointing the ministers himself, but what is the relationship between the prime minister and the delegate? The delegate is elected directly by the nations but has little power, so in the context of a lack of commitment wouldn't it be better to give power back to the delegate who is potentially "closer" to the nations of the region

Reply

I fully support the concept of this.

Like Kris, I'd like to see a discussion of if there should be Assembly confirmation and if so what confirmation.

Like Comfed, I think the idea of "collective responsibility" for the Cabinet should end and that there should be total portfolio flexibility for the Prime Minister.

I want to add something about the GC more generally: I wonder how useful it is to make OPs that list edits to laws in the context of the laws-as-written given that so much of the architecture of our laws is likely to change during the GC.

However, I do believe that two Ministries MUST exist as fixed, given the game mechanics: Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I disagree with this. A Prime Minister could choose to exercise foreign affairs responsibilities themselves, or delegate them to a "Council" in absence of having a single "Minister" of Foreign Affairs. A Prime Minister could choose not to appoint a "Minister" of Defense, instead opting for the governance of the Ministry/SPSF to be done by the SPSF's Officers jointly.

Ultimately, the demands of any given moment will vary wildly, and the Prime Minister should have flexibility to pick the team they need.

perhaps codifying an obligation of the Prime Minister (or his appointed subsidiary) to present ''briefings'' to the Assembly on a regular basis.

I disagree with codifying this. What briefings and how they will be presented should be something that Prime Ministers campaign on. Often, they are standard practice, but not always, and that's up to the Prime Minister's decision and the Assembly's demands.

Furthermore, it's incredibly subjective. If the Prime Minister submits two memes to the Assembly, does that count as a 'briefing'? How much communication the Prime Minister does with the Assembly is a difficult question to codify, and is best left to the Assembly as a political and accountability question.

I wonder whether we should instead codify specific responsibilities (related to game mechanics) that the Prime Minister or a duly appointed minister must fulfil

I'm intrigued by this idea and would be interested in draft language about it.

Not having stable ministries would imply that their members must change positions regularly, which risks causing disengagement.

I think the status quo disproves this. Lack of flexibility to change things or new energy/platform willpower in Ministries risks disengagement. In the status quo, the Prime Minister has limited-to-no power to shake up and transform Ministries when they may be in dire need of it. If a Ministry is actually working, the Prime Minister is unlikely to restructure it.

And doesn't the possibility that new ministries appear without their function being governed by the charter risk destabilizing the cabinet?

Can you elaborate on this? How would it "destabilize the cabinet" and what are the consequences of that?

wouldn't it be better to give power back to the delegate who is potentially "closer" to the nations of the region

The Prime Minister is also elected directly by the members of the region. The distinction between the two would be in the job they are expected/asked to perform, not in the amount of accountability they have to the region.

Minister of Foreign Affairs
General of the South Pacific Special Forces
Ambassador to Balder
Former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense

(This post was last modified: 07-18-2022, 02:36 PM by HumanSanity.)

Reply

Should we move to an appointment-based cabinet, which I have supported for a long time, we should definitely include a confirmation system or some sort of challenge that allows citizens with a bold agenda to run the ministry themselves if they don't agree with the PM's appointment.

Rather than codifying specific ministries, I wonder whether we should instead codify specific responsibilities (related to game mechanics) that the Prime Minister or a duly appointed minister must fulfil. The constitutional law therefore becomes a sort of "minimum viable product" of what duties must be carried out, with prospective PMs then free to fill the rest of their agenda as they see fit.

Yeah, this is something I agree with. We don't have to entirely decodify the cabinet portfolios per se but list a few constitutional portfolios (i.e. permanently retaining a foreign ministry).

Not having stable ministries would imply that their members must change positions regularly, which risks causing disengagement.

And doesn't the possibility that new ministries appear without their function being governed by the charter risk destabilizing the cabinet?

About the proposal, the prime minister has more power by appointing the ministers himself, but what is the relationship between the prime minister and the delegate? The delegate is elected directly by the nations but has little power, so in the context of a lack of commitment wouldn't it be better to give power back to the delegate who is potentially "closer" to the nations of the region

I have to disagree with you on this. Under the existing system, we have such a rigid regime that limits what we can do and result in the expansion and bloating of a single minister's portfolio. We can see that through the former Ministry of Regional Affairs. The appointment system and allowing the PM to decide what ministries exist (other than the constitutional portfolios I mentioned above) allows for creativity and prevent a bloated portfolio. For example, I was particularly intrigued when TNP delegate Tlomz announced a cards ministry. That's an amazing thing we could have done here, but it just wasn't possible because of the constitutional rigidity of our cabinet and the election-based system we have.

4× Cabinet minister /// 1× OWL director /// CRS member /// SPSF

My History

Reply

There might be a middle ground here via maintaing direct election to constitutional ministries - foreign affairs & defense - and Delegate/Prime Ministerial (once we settle the HoS/HoG issue) appointment to non-constitutional ministries.

I think competitive election to ministerial office is one of the best things about TSP and has allowed our region to grow and change organically. Some of our best Ministers would never have made it into office via appointment and changes like us becoming a Defender region probably wouldn't have come about without it.

_{Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making}
^{Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator}

---

PREVIOUS ROLES

Former Delegate (x2.5)
Former Member of the Committee for State Security
Former Chief Justice of The High Court (x3)
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (x2)
Former Chair of the Assembly (x3)
Former Minister of Security (x2)
Former Local Councillor (x2.5)
Former Forum Administrator
Former Minister of Media

Reply

For example, I was particularly intrigued when TNP delegate Tlomz announced a cards ministry. That's an amazing thing we could have done here, but it just wasn't possible because of the constitutional rigidity of our cabinet and the election-based system we have.

I don't know if I would agree with that assessment. I don't oppose the idea of letting the head of government deciding which ministries to have, but I don't think the region benefits much from the creation of issue-specific ministries without a proven need for that level of infrastructure. I'm not saying that is something that this would need to be hard-coded into the law, but I would generally advice future executives to carefully consider whether a ministry is truly needed or if similar functions could be performed under existing institutions.

Former Delegate of the South Pacific
Posts outside High Court venues should be taken as those of any other legislator.
I do not participate in the regional server, but I am happy to talk through instant messaging or on the forum.

Legal Resources:
THE MATT-DUCK Law Archive | Mavenu Diplomatic Archive | Rules of the High Court | Case Submission System | Online Rulings Consultation System

(This post was last modified: 07-18-2022, 04:42 PM by Kris Kringle.)

Reply