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**Belschaft** · 12-04-2014, 03:45 AM

Honoured Justices,

I would like to request a review of the actions of the Chair of Assembly in regards to the events surrounding proposed alterations to parole. Seeing how he has now twice refused to bring to vote legislation duly motioned to vote, it would seem that he is in knowing and wilful breach of the law, clarified by this very ruling.

Could the court confirm whether or not the Chair is in breach of the law? And, if so, what consequences does an official face for breaking the law in such manner?

_{Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making}
^{Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator}

PREVIOUS ROLES

(This post was last modified: 12-15-2014, 04:55 AM by nlevels.)

~~Unibot~~ · 12-05-2014, 06:42 AM

On the contrary, throughout the discussion, I maintained that I intended to place the proposal to vote. I had asked HEM to answer some specific questions regarding the proposal - it appeared as though it was saying one thing and doing another; HEM said he would respond within 24 hours and HEM has been unavailable for comment, so it went to vote.

Due process was followed. There was a motion, there was a second and it went to vote. Never did the Chair not intend to bring the vote to the floor, but I did feel it was important that the proposal was vetted properly -- it appeared to have some outstanding contradictions with the Charter (and more importantly, there was a fear that the law could apply retroactively).

Nowhere does the Charter compel the Chair to speedily put something to vote as soon as the ink is pressed on a second. I would not being doing my due dilegence as Chair if I just put everything to vote as soon as they are seconded, even when I believe they have not been vetted thoroughly -- I am tasked with being "responsible for the administration of all aspects of the drafting, debate, and passage of legislation".

**Belschaft** · 12-05-2014, 10:25 AM

Yours honors, whilst the Assembly requires some degree of management to function effectively, such management must be both consistent and objective. The barriers the Chair attempted to place before the legislation in question were both unique and beyond anything in prior precedent. This clearly indicates that the Chairs actions were neither consistent or objective in this case, and instead clearly indicative of partisan activity. There is a clear history of the Chair abusing the powers of his office to prevent legislation he politically opposes from being brought to vote, which when combined with the fact that the Chair only relented when faced with the intervention of the Court that his motives were not what he so claims. I argue that his behavior indicated every intention to prevent the legislation ever being brought to vote. I argue that the matter should be judged by his behavior rather than his words here, and the simple fact he did everything in his power to block a vote condemns him.

_{Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making}
^{Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator}

PREVIOUS ROLES

~~Unibot~~ · 12-05-2014, 11:45 AM

Quote:The barriers the Chair attempted to place before the legislation in question were both unique and beyond anything in prior preceden

It was incredibly unusual on the part of the proposal's supporters to continue to motion and second a proposal that had outstanding constitutional issues and to refuse on the part of HEM (who hasn't even been around) to consider rewriting parts of the law to bring it within clear fidelity with the law.

Usually when there are problems with laws, the drafters just work to clarify the law and we move to vote short after that - the supporters were totally unwilling to consider any changes and began threatening that "democracy had fallen". Beyond sheer psychodrama, your hysteria had no relevance whatsoever to reality. It was bizarre behavior, but perhaps it made sense within the emotional context of a passionate vote which transcended a oft-rational composure of some legislators. This debate was also unusual in that it surrounded one of the most controversial and heated topics that The South Pacific has considered in some time - passions ran high and as such, after twenty pages, there was a duty on my part to ask the drafters to consider and vet the proposal seriously when issues arose.

Furthermore, I did not do everything within my power to block the vote - it went to vote. If I did everything within my power to block the vote, it would still be delayed. There is a distinction between "blocking" a vote and asking questions and expecting answers regarding clarifications to the law. My actions suggest that I wanted the proposal vetted, that implies every intention to vote on it - I don't just vet stuff because I like to vet things. I vet them because I have a duty to vet proposals and ensure that process runs smoothly as we transition from drafting to voting.

(This post was last modified: 12-05-2014, 11:51 AM by Sandwich Territories.)

Gustave Berr · 12-05-2014, 03:29 PM

Thank you both for your 'testimony'. The Court is currently discussing if the Chair has failed to fulfill his duties as outlined by our Law. We will have a ruling shortly.

United States of Kalukmangala

Former High Court Justice

Gustave Berr · 12-15-2014, 04:53 AM

[Image: HCSeal.png]

HCLQ1408

- 13.12.14 -

Petitioner

Belschaft

Presiding Justices

Awe, Farengeto, Gustave Berr

Non-Presiding Justice

Llamas

Honoured Justices,

I would like to request a review of the actions of the Chair of Assembly in regards to the events surrounding proposed alterations to parole. Seeing how he has now twice refused to bring to vote legislation duly motioned to vote, it would seem that he is in knowing and wilful breach of the law, clarified by this very ruling.

Could the court confirm whether or not the Chair is in breach of the law? And, if so, what consequences does an official face for breaking the law in such manner?

Majority Opinion

Awe, Farengeto, Gustave Berr

After careful deliberation, the High Court issues the following judgement in response to the Legal Question submitted by Belchaft.

In response to whether the Chair of the Assembly's delaying of the vote was in breach of the law, while the Court understands and acknowledges that some parties are frustrated that a draft, having received a motion and a second, still took some time to be placed a vote, the Court notes that the Chair of the Assembly was upfront about his reasoning for delaying the vote, stating that he felt more time was needed before the Assembly could adequately and objectively discuss the proposal. It is in the Court's opinion that the actions of the Chair of the Assembly were actions consistent with appropriately fulfilling the duties of the Chair of the Assembly.

With regards to the issue of punishment and legal ramifications, the Court is unable to render a judgement as the misuse of authority is not a criminal offence, of which are defined in Articles 5 and 6 of the Code of Laws in the Penal and Criminal Code. Furthermore, no legal proceedings have been initiated against the Chair of the Assembly.

The Court further acknowledges that this judgement is in contradiction with a previous judgement, HCLQ1407, and has resolved to partially overturn the judgement, as reflected below:

Quote: Wrote:"As the Chair is responsible for the passage of legislation, in this case contradictory or otherwise, personal discretion or executive policy should not apply as this may obstruct the passage of legislation, thus preventing the Chair from fulfilling legal obligations in the discharge and execution of his duties."

will be amended to

"The Chair may exercise personal discretion in the movement of legislation where appropriate, with an explanation being provided to the Assembly. However, it is maintained that all legislation that has been motioned and seconded must be voted upon, unless withdrawn by the drafter, or wherein new Laws have been passed by the Assembly that result in the change of circumstances."

This change arises as a result of the consensus by the Court Justices that the actions of the Chair of the Assembly, in this case, consisted of using personal discretion in delaying a vote to ensure objective discussion and fairness for multiple pieces of Legislation, having been motioned and seconded by the Assembly, and putting them to vote at the same time. It is in the Court's opinion that these were logical actions, and that the previous ruling was somewhat restrictive on the powers of the Chair of the Assembly.

However, this Court also believes that a form of check and balance should be put in place on the actions of the Chair of the Assembly, that while allowing the Chair of the Assembly to utilise personal discretion, the Chair must still remain accountable to the Cabinet and the Assembly of the South Pacific.

In light of this Legal Question, The High Court recommends that in addition to having the Chair of the Assembly provide a detailed explanation when personal discretion is utilised, the Assembly should also examine Article 3, Section 2 of the Charter and clearly define what, if any, discretionary powers the Chair of the Assembly should posses.

United States of Kalukmangala

Former High Court Justice

~~Unibot~~ · 12-21-2014, 05:45 PM

Thank you, I appreciate the ruling and the clarification of the previous ruling, Justices.