| LQ: The CPA |
This is a straightforward question. Given that the Court Procedures Act contradicts the single justice system in the Charter, can the Court use its Article 8.5 powers to reconcile that contradiction for criminal trial procedure, so that a criminal trial can take place speedily in the absence of the Assembly fixing the legislation?
Whereas sandaoguo requested this Court that a review be conducted on certain issues related to the interpretation of the law with the following question:
Can the Court use its Article 8.5 powers to reconcile that contradiction for criminal trial procedure, so that a criminal trial can take place speedily in the absence of the Assembly fixing the legislation?
Whereas this Court has conducted a careful review of the merits of such a request on the basis of its legal necessity and potential to impact present and future policies.
It is resolved with respect to this Legal Question as follows:
Kris Kringle Permanent Justice Former Delegate of the South Pacific
Posts outside High Court venues should be taken as those of any other legislator. I do not participate in the regional server, but I am happy to talk through instant messaging or on the forum. Legal Resources: THE MATT-DUCK Law Archive | Mavenu Diplomatic Archive | Rules of the High Court | Case Submission System | Online Rulings Consultation System
Your Honour,
Has there been any progress made on this Legal Question?
I'm sure Kris is working on it. Or, he just had too much SPIT with Gin...
Signed,
![[Image: tspsig.png]](https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/323623854591180801/329130815340412930/tspsig.png) Positions:
Legislator of The South Pacific King of Machina, Defence Realm of Illuminati Alliance Citizen of The East Pacific Former Positions:
Overlord of Masterz
Seargant of HYDRA Talon of Firehehlm Munifiex of The Roman Empire ![[Image: rv43j5bZ3p1Rs0A01odvThXy-TLzgwlhUTl_mY9E...66-h654-rw]](https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/rv43j5bZ3p1Rs0A01odvThXy-TLzgwlhUTl_mY9EGkiEks-YKf31JOYzp7pyzeivAZlE_6KpcL0UZes=w1366-h654-rw)
For Immediate Release
19 November 2017 The Court provides notice to the general public that the ruling on Anachronism in the Court Procedures Act [HCLQ1712] will be released on 20 November 2017 at 20:00 EST. The Court will thereafter entertain questions and doubts regarding the legal reasoning expressed in its ruling, and the process it followed in the consideration of the legal question, but it will not consider questions regarding the political ramifications of the same, nor will it express opinions of a political nature on any other unrelated subject. Former Delegate of the South Pacific
Posts outside High Court venues should be taken as those of any other legislator. I do not participate in the regional server, but I am happy to talk through instant messaging or on the forum. Legal Resources: THE MATT-DUCK Law Archive | Mavenu Diplomatic Archive | Rules of the High Court | Case Submission System | Online Rulings Consultation System
HIGH COURT OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC
- HCLQ1712 - ANACHRONISM IN THE COURT PROCEDURES ACT CAN THE COURT USE ITS ARTICLE 8.5 POWERS TO RECONCILE THE CONTRADICTION FOR CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURE, SO THAT A CRIMINAL TRIAL CAN TAKE PLACE SPEEDILY IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ASSEMBLY FIXING THE LEGISLATION? 20 NOVEMBER 2017 Justice KRINGLE delivered the Opinion. AAV WHITEHALL served as Law Clerk for this case.
Summary of the Ruling It is the opinion of the Court that all references to "Court Justices" in the Court Procedures Act should be taken to refer to the presiding officer, who may be the Permanent Justice or a member of the Pool of Justices. An examination of the legal and customary mechanics of the High Court leads to the conclusion that the term "Court Justices" refers to the presiding officer of the Court. A closer look at the historical context leads to the additional conclusion that said term is an anachronism from the time when the Court had multiple presiding officers. Based on the above reasons, as well as the principle of minimal disruption mandated by the Charter, these terms should be applied to the current system of a single presiding officer.
While this power has been seldom used, the Court does have the ability to reconcile contradictions between laws, ensuring that statutes remain consistent with each other and that the region can operate under a predictable and adequate legal system. In view of the contradictions detected by the Defence in Roavin v. Cormac, the Court has consented to reconcile the contradictions between a Charter and a Court Procedures Act that seem to disagree on certain key provisions regarding the administration of criminal trials.
I
While some precedent exists regarding the power of the Court to reconcile contradictions, this precedent is in the form of Article 9 and Rights to Appeal and Free Speech [SCLQ1401], a ruling that resulted in the decision that no contradiction existed. This makes said case, for evident reasons, inadequate for examination as precedent applicable to the present situation.
In its place, the Court must employ a reasonable interpretation of the law and examine the way in which said law has been applied through the months, ever since the High Court gained its current legal structure. A. The Charter and the Court Procedures Act It would be useful to agree on certain basic points regarding the legal basis for the operation of the Court. There are two broad categories for such points: those arising from the Charter, and those arising from their codification in the Court Procedures Act. Regarding those points arising from the Charter, there are two that must be mentioned. First, the Charter mandates that the Court “will consist of one Permanent Justice and a Pool of Justices” to exercise “exclusive judicial authority”. Second, it also mandates that further procedures on the appointment of such officials and the conduction of judicial procedures, be they criminal trials or civil cases should be codified in a general law. It would be useful to focus on the first point. As a cursory review of the history of judicial reform will show, prior to its current structure, the High Court was composed of four justices, three of whom would preside a case at any given time, while the remaining justice would serve in an appellate capacity, should an appeal be filed. This system ensured that decisions were made not by one person, but rather by a number of individuals who would all be well versed in the law, therefore increasing the chances for a reasoned and informed debate on the merits and particulars of each case. In opposition to that, the current system mandates, as was quoted earlier, that there be a single Permanent Justice, serving alongside a Pool of Justices. While the Charter does not offer specific on the particular duties of each, there are some important conclusions to be drawn simply from an understanding of the historical context, as provided above. Under the previous system, justices were explicitly given equal standing, and expected to work together to handle all cases before their bench. The fact that the current system should specifically name a single Permanent Justice lends itself to the conclusion that this official would be the primary presiding officer for the majority of cases. There is no legal support for this conclusion in the Charter itself, however. For that, one must refer to Article 2 of the Court Procedures Act, the general law that was written for further codify the procedures of the High Court. Article 2, Section 1 indicates that the Pool of Justices consists of “at least four individuals to serve as temporary and appellate Justices”. This section is key because, as a provision that was written when the Court was reformed to its current iteration, it reflects the original intent of said reform. It would be reasonable to assume then that those in the Pool of Justices would serve the same function as the fourth justice under the previous system, that being to hear appeals when and if they were filed. This interpretation is further confirmed by Article 3, Section 8 which indicates that, should the ruling on a legal question be appealed, “an appellate Justice from the Pool of Justices” will be tasked with administering all steps of the appeals process, including deciding whether or not to hear the appeal. While there is no equivalent language for criminal trials, the fact that such a provision exists for civil cases reinforces the interpretation that the purpose of the Pool of Justices is designed to hear appeals. It would also be sensible to assume that, should the Permanent Justice recuse from a certain case, the most senior and available justice from the Pool of Justices would be tasked with the consideration of the case at hand, thus fulfilling the “temporary” descriptor in the provision that says members from the Pool of Justices shall “serve as temporary and appellate Justices”. B. Practice of the High Court This is all meaningless, however, if that is not how the Court operates in reality. In spite of the fact that this Court may offer an interpretation of the law, it remains important to examine how that interpretation complies with the custom that has developed since the Court was reformed to its current iteration. Once again, one must refer to the historical record. A review of all cases since The Chair of the Assembly’s Discretion [HCLQ1601], which is the first case decided since the aforementioned reform, will reveal that only the Permanent Justices presides over cases, and they always do so by themselves, without the formal input of any member of the Pool of Justices. This practice has been preserved by all individuals serving as Permanent Justice. In addition, while the Court would not presume to speak on behalf of others, it would be sensible to assert that the public has accepted this practice as acceptable, thereby lending credence to the interpretation that there should only be one presiding official for any given Court case. If there should be further proof that the Permanent Justice functions as the sole presiding officer, and that the Pool of Justices served in a “temporary and appellate” capacity, one should refer to Legality of Hileville and the Cabinet’s Actions of 21 January [HCLQ1602], where Sandaoguo challenged the legality of certain Cabinet actions. While Justice Farengeto agreed to hear three of the questions posed, he argued that the fourth posed a conflict of interest for him, and consequently recused from it. In his place, as the most senior available member from the Pool of Justices, Feirmont was assigned to hear the fourth question. Feirmont never considered the question, but the precedent set by Justice Farengeto serves as proof of the role the Pool of Justices plays in presiding over cases, and under what circumstances that may happen. C. Potential Issues However interesting this interpretation might be, there are certain issues that must be addressed if it will truly reflect a reasonable reading of the law. It has been established that the Pool of Justices serves in a “temporary and appellate capacity”, and precedent has been produced to show that this has been the case for legal questions. The question remains, however, of how applicable this is for criminal cases, which is where the contradiction lies, after all. Article 4 of the Court Procedures Act makes several mentions of “Court Justices”, which combined given the impression that an unspecified number of justices should jointly administer all the steps of the criminal case. There is a number of reasons why this contradiction is not as serious as one could initially believe. First, because Article 4, Section 4 refers to a “Chief Justice”. As a reading of the Charter, the Judiciary Act and the Court Procedures Act will reveal, there is no such position. It did exist, however, under the previous iteration of the Court, when the four justices would elect one of their own to serve as Chief Justice. This provides a strong incentive to believe that this provision was not properly updated when the Court was reformed. If that provision was not updated, would it not make sense to say that other provisions, referring to multiple “Court Justices”, are also in need of a proper updating to reflect the current composition of the Court? Second, even if Article 4 of the Court Procedures Act were interpreted as applying to an unspecified number of justices, it would necessarily have to apply only to those justices who are presiding over the case, since that was the standard applied to the Court under its previous iteration. It would have made no sense to require that the appeals justice participate in the original deliberation of the case. Thus, it would make no sense to force “temporary and appellate Justices” to participate in the original deliberation of a case whose appeal they might have to hear. Under this hypothetical interpretation, the Permanent Justice, or the temporary presiding office, in any case, would still remain the only official covered under the provisions of “Court Justices”. Third, the Charter provides the Court with useful guidance on the reconciliation of contradictions. Article VIII, Section 5 of the Charter indicates that reconciliation must happen with “the least amount of disruption to the intended purposes” of the provisions found in contradiction. This means that, unless proof to the contrary is found, and this Court has found none, it would be least disruptive, and certainly more consistent with the broad intent of the latest judicial reform to rule that criminal cases and civil cases should operate under a similar set of rules, to ensure consistency in the judiciary. A ruling that denied said consistency could produce more issues. If “Court Justices” does not refer to the presiding officer, be that the Permanent Justice or a member of the Pool of Justices, to whom does it refer? Is it the Permanent Justice and an unspecified number of temporary justices? Is it a set of temporary justices specially appointed for the particular criminal case? Would it truly make sense to assume that the judicial reform meant for there to be such a wild discrepancy in the way criminal and civil cases were administered? Why allow the Permanent Justice to preside over civil cases, but not provide for the same for criminal cases? It is more reasonable, and less disruptive, to interpret “Court Justices” as being a leftover provision from an earlier time, and even then, as applying to whoever is presiding over the case. This ensures internal consistency in the administration of cases, follows the common practice of the Court, and is a logical and simple approach that follows the intended goals of the latest judicial reform. II
It is always difficult to reconcile contradictions. When there are two sets of laws, there is ultimately a question of which law should be given greater precedence, and whether it is even fair that such precedence should be given. This is even more relevant to the present case, given the case of Roavin v. Cormac, and the criminal implications that would follow. It is important to remember, however, that any reconciliation will ultimately follow the guidelines set by the Charter, and will involve an examination of the historical context, seeking to understand how the contradiction came to be, and opting for a solution that solves the underlying issues.
In the present case, the fact that Article 4 of the Court Procedures Act refers to multiple “Court Justices” is initially distracting, but makes sense when viewed within the broader historical context, and particularly when one examines the custom that followed the latest judicial reform. These provisions must be seen as nothing more than anachronisms, which can certainly be interpreted in such a way that they fit with the current structure of the Court, but ultimately provisions that do not reflect said structure. Instead, the principle of minimal disruption, and the own interest of the Court for consistency in its administrative and judicial procedures, indicate that these provisions should indeed be seen as anachronisms, left over from the latest reform, and that they should be understood to apply to the Permanent Justice, or to that member of the Pool of Justices that is presiding over the relevant case, in all ways applicable. It is so ordered. Former Delegate of the South Pacific
Posts outside High Court venues should be taken as those of any other legislator. I do not participate in the regional server, but I am happy to talk through instant messaging or on the forum. Legal Resources: THE MATT-DUCK Law Archive | Mavenu Diplomatic Archive | Rules of the High Court | Case Submission System | Online Rulings Consultation System
As an interested party to this matter, I must submit an appeal under the terms of Article 3, Section 7, of the Court Procedures Act, to wit;
1. That Permanent Justice Kringallia has demonstrated judicial misconduct by ruling on a matter to which he has a personal and direct conflict of interest, being the Presiding Justice on Roavin vs. Cormac. 2. That this ruling has produced a serious contradiction in law - specifically, Article 3, Section 2, of the Charter "The right to a fair trial and defence against criminal accusations will not be abridged." No less than six separate and specific references to "Court Justices" acting "collectively" cannot by any reasonable definition of the word be considered a mere anachronism; this party can and will argue that the requirement for multiple justices to make such decisions is integral to the provision of a fair trial. The "interpretation" of a specific requirement for multiple justices to mean decisions being made by a single justice is not only absurd, it is a direct abridgement of Article 3 rights and freedoms. Whilst this ruling may provide the "least amount of disruption" to the operations of the court, it causes the most disruption to the Charter and Article 3 which must - by law and principle - take precedence. Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making
Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator ![[Image: B9ytUsy.png]](https://i.imgur.com/B9ytUsy.png)
For it to be judicial misconduct, Kris would need a demonstrable interest in the outcome of Cormac's trial.
The second complaint is absurd on its face. I asked this Legal Question to reconcile the very contradiction in law that Belschaft is now saying it creates. Well, yes, the ruling contradicts the black and white letter of the law--- it must, because the Court is being asked to reconcile an old law with a new system. Cormac (not that he's even here in any real sense-- if anything is being denied, it's Belschaft's own desire to be a lawyer) isn't being denied a fair trial, unless Belschaft is willing to argue that the he'd be denied a fair trial if the Assembly tomorrow were to fix the CPA itself.
The CPA produces a specific requirement that multiple Justices collectively decide questions of guilt and sentence, amongst other things. Absent that provision and it's replacement with an illegal "single Justice" system by the very same single Justice my client has had his right to a fair trial severely abridged.
Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making
Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator
HIGH COURT OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC
- HCLQ1712 - ANACHRONISM IN THE COURT PROCEDURES ACT 22 NOVEMBER 2017 Whereas Belschaft has appealed the opinion written by Permanent Justice Kringle for Anachronism in the Court Procedures Act [HCLQ1712].
Whereas Belschaft has stated his belief that Permanent Justice Kringle has demonstrated judicial misconduct in writing the aforementioned opinion. Whereas Belschaft has stated his belief that the opinion engages in a contradiction of law. Whereas Article 3, Section 8 of the Court Procedures Act requires that appeals be duly evaluated for their validly by a member of the Pool of Justices. It is resolved as follows:
It is so ordered. Former Delegate of the South Pacific
Posts outside High Court venues should be taken as those of any other legislator. I do not participate in the regional server, but I am happy to talk through instant messaging or on the forum. Legal Resources: THE MATT-DUCK Law Archive | Mavenu Diplomatic Archive | Rules of the High Court | Case Submission System | Online Rulings Consultation System |
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