| Appeal: Legislator application |
I would like to challenge the reason of Past disruptive behaviour for the rejection of legislator status to the High Court
Erm... If I am not imposing, can we try to get this appeal on the road please ?
![[Image: BYEo2lg.png]](https://i.imgur.com/BYEo2lg.png) Determination of Justiciability Whereas Malayan Singapura has requested this Court to review the decision by the Legislator Committee in denying their application on grounds of bad behaviors,
Whereas this Court has conducted a careful review of the merits of such a request on the basis of its legal necessity and potential to impact present and future policies.
It is resolved with respect to this appeal as follows:
Sandaoguo Associate Justice
Your Honourable Justice,
Amicus Brief filed by Beepee Question HCLQ 1804 [Can the]Court hear appeals of legislator application denials by the Legislator Committee? Law Cited: Charter of the Coalition of the South Pacific (Charter) Legislator Committee Act Judicial Act Relevant Case Law Cited: HCRR1801 The Question. The question posed by the Justice is limited, as I understand, solely to the question as to whether the Court can hear the appeal: not as to the veracity of the appeal. Whilst there is overlap, I shall try to limit my response to the former. On prima facie, it may not appear that the right of appeal exists for Malayan Singapura, the appellant, to appeal a denial of legislator status. However, I respectfully consider it within the scope of the Courts to assess the appeal against the refusal to grant Legislator status following proper application. I contend: First, there is a contradiction of Law, Second, there has been a process violation by the Legislator Committee, and resulting in Thirdly, the appellants constitutional rights having been denied. Contention First I, firstly, direct the Justices to the Charter which under Article I(2) states 2. Constitutional laws hold precedence and supremacy over all other laws, regulations, and policies of all branches of government. And continues at Article I(3) 3. This Charter is a constitutional law holding supremacy over all others, and defines the purpose of our government and its framework. Article III(4) states 4. No member may be denied the right to vote or hold office, unless prohibited by constitutional law. Article VIII(4) through (7) state 4. The High Court has the power to declare any general law or regulation, Cabinet directive, Chair determination, and Local Council law or regulation, in whole or in part, void upon determination that it violates the terms of this Charter or any other constitutional law. 5. The High Court may reconcile contradictions within the Charter, constitutional laws, general laws, Cabinet directives, and Local Council laws and regulations, maintaining the least amount of disruption to the intended purposes of the contradictory parts. 6. The High Court may clarify and interpret provisions of law, when presented with a Legal Question about them. I consider, and I respectfully suggest the Court may find, that there is conflict and contradiction between the Charter and the Legislator Committee Act which requires reconciliation. Such reconciliation is within the powers of the Court through Article VIII(5) of the Charter. Particulars Within the Charter, under the section Legislator Eligibility the Justices will find the following: Section 5. A standing commission of legislators will be tasked with granting and revoking legislator status. All residents of the Coalition are eligible to attain legislator status through application. Continued legislator status requires active membership and good behaviour. Point First 'Revoking' is not defined in the charter. So one must assess the standard legal definition of revoke which is to annul, call back or recall. 'Revoke is not to 'refuse' or 'deny' which have their own legal definitions. I respectfully suggest that as the appellant has not received legislator status it cannot be revoked and therefore complete applications must be approved by the Committee unless contrary to the provisions of the application. Furthermore I opine there is no scope within the Charter to refuse or deny an application, only to 'grant' or 'revoke'. As such the appellant has been denied his constitutional rights, and the only recourse is through the Courts. Point Second The final sentence of the Legislator Eligibility criteria states all citizens are eligible to attain the status through application. Continued status is based only on activity and good behaviour not, there is no restriction on the acceptance to the status. Again, I opine again, the appellant may not be denied legislator status and has the right to that class under the Charter as all citizens are eligible to attain the status, under Article III(4) and that there is no constitutional right to refuse or deny that status. Point Third The Charter is silent refusing to grant legislator status: only allowing the Committee to revoke or grant. As such, I opine, it is not within the Charter to refuse Legislator status. Such an outcome must, surely, be considered perverse under the law. Restrictions must be able to placed in the interests of regional security, e.t.c., e.t.c.. Unless the Justices are to define the law as an ass in this instance, it must be argued, that clarification is then sought from the Legislator Committee Act. The scope of this Act reiterates the Charter: (1) The Legislator Committee is the commission responsible for granting and revoking legislator status to members. The same particulars from above therefore remain. However, Article 2 states. (1) Any member of the Coalition is eligible to attain legislator status if a. the Legislator Committee does not opine that they are seeking membership in bad faith, b. they have a nation in the South Pacific, c. are not attempting to join with multiple nations or identities, and d. are not considered by the Council on Regional Security to be a significant risk to regional security. Point Fourth The key phrase is "eligable to attain", without straying into the merits of the appellant case, there is no mention of refusal of status: only a presumption in favour of attainment of status. Again, without straying into the merits of the case I note solely, the reason provided in the response to the appellant does not argue the specifics of the point of Article 2(1). To refuse not on these grounds may constitute a process violation and such an order is contrary to the findings of HC1801 which noted the appellant 'may be allowed to rejoin the region with the full privileges and responsibilities of membership.' Naturally the question is raised as to what occurs to those citizens who do not achieve the restrictions placed under Article 2(1). Point Fifth Article 2(5) states: Upon acceptance or denial of an application, the Legislator Committee shall post the result (including a sufficient reason in case of a denial) both in response to the application as well as per telegram to the applicant nation. I bring to attention of the Justices the word 'denial'. At no location within the Charter or elsewhere within the Legislator Committee Act does 'Denial' of status appear. To deny or refuse an application, whilst practically and pragmatically the most logical and astute method of determining applications for legislator status which fail to meet criteria under Article 2(1), the Charter and the scope of the Legislator Committee Act do not allow for denial and unduly restricts the right to eligibility under the Charter. Contention Second For the reasons set out above, even if it were found that there is no contradiction in law, there is a case on the grounds of process violations against the Legislator Committee As Article 2 (1) of the Legislator Committee Act states Any member of the Coalition is eligible to attain legislator status if a. the Legislator Committee does not opine that they are seeking membership in bad faith, b. they have a nation in the South Pacific, c. are not attempting to join with multiple nations or identities, and d. are not considered by the Council on Regional Security to be a significant risk to regional security. The Committee has not refused on these grounds, rather on the grounds of past bad behaviour. Failing to follow the reasons of the Act must, I opine, be considered (1.) a process violation and (2.) An untested restriction on the appellants constitutional rights. I draw the Justices attention to the Judicial Act Article 7: Appeals which states (1) An appeal is a case for which the petitioner seeks to reverse or reevaluate a concluded case that itself is not an appeal. An appeal may be filed by any member of the South Pacific or by any non-member with a vested interest in the case. (2) Appeals may only be submitted on grounds of process violations, contradictions of law, or judicial misconduct. (3) The assigned justice of the case being appealed is automatically recused from the appeal case. Whilst it may be contested that Article 7, is solely for the purposes of appeals against a decision made by the Courts, this is not explicitly stated and as such an argument can be made that any process violation can be considered through this Article. Furthermore, natural Justice would normally allow for a right of appeal against a determination where the removes ability of status automatically conferred by the Charter or where a constitutional right to status has been denied. Finally, I suggest, although no right of appeal exists in the Legislator Committee Act, the refusal should be considered a breach of Article I(3) of the Charter, which takes precedence, that does not allow for the denial of status. Contention Third The matters of constitutional rights have been discussed in Contentions First and Second above. Article III(6) Rights and Freedoms of the Charter states 6. The High Court may strike down any general law or action that violates any right or freedom found in this Charter Of note here isthe word 'action'. The refusal of status is an action, which violates the appellants rights. In summary: I. The Charter does not allow denial/refusal of an application, whereas the Legislator Committee Act does. The Charter takes precedence in this matter. The Courts should, I respectfully opine, therefore consider the appeal under Articles VIII(4) through (7) of the Charter which seeks to reconcile conflicting laws. II. The Legislator Committee has failed in its process to accord with the Legislator Committee Act which allows the appeal under Article 7 of the Judicial Act and Article I(3) of the Charter which innominately allows for such appeals against decisions. III. The appellants constitutional rights have been denied and proper legal recourse for denial of constitutional rights must solely be through the Court under Article III(6) of the Charter. Provided in good faith and with respect. Beepee
My stance is the exact same as Beepee’s your honor. Give or take the style of para-phrasing.
Your Honor,
this brief, as I began drafting it, started out very differently than what it has become. Any reasonable person will intuit an answer to HCLQ1804 that allows the court to review a denial and to order a reevaluation if it finds that the denial was not lawfully grounded. As principal author of both the Legislator Committee Act and the Judicial Act, I considered myself the perfect expert witness on the subject, and began to draft my response. I already knew my argument (outlined below), but as I began to search for the appropriate citations in law, I stumbled upon roadblock after roadblock, and realized just why the court opened this case. In short, my intuitive argument is as follows: the High Court is empowered by the Charter to review actions and strike them down if found to be unlawful. Such reviews are Legal Questions as per the Judicial Act ("Is this concrete action lawful?"). Malayan Singapura is a member, as determined in HCRR1801, which means they have standing to submit legal questions and therefore the question is justiciable. The issue is that the Court is only selectively empowered by the Charter, and I honestly don't know why. III.6 allows the court to strike down actions, but only if those violate rights or freedoms. VIII.4 lets the court strike down laws and regulations, but not actions/directives/orders unless they are specifically from the Cabinet or Chair of Assembly, and only if they violate the Charter or constitutional law, while general law can be, basically, violated at will. Frankly, these restrictions are absurd. Beyond absurd, even, they are horrifying. I don't even dare to write out all the ways in which laws can be violated at will with no possibility for legal recourse given literal interpretations. This is something that will have to be addressed through the assembly going forward, but for now, this must be considered properly in this context as well to not violate ex post facto protections. I propose two possible solutions: Solution 1: The Court directly recognizes the above restrictions as absurd, and applies the golden rule of statutory interpretation. This is the easiest solution, though possibly somewhat over-reaching (and I would prefer all three justices sign off on an opinion if done in such a way). Solution 2: Sandaoguo recuses from HCLQ1804 (not from the original question in this thread) to testify as author of the Charter why these restrictions are in place and with what intent they were written. I'll be open for more questions tomorrow, I'm busy reeling in horror for the rest of the day. ![[Image: XXPV74Y.png?1]](https://i.imgur.com/XXPV74Y.png?1)
Your honor, this severly infringes on the few rights I am able to exercise. I can't even ask cabinet candidates questions on why they should be elected, or read TSP media that it not the TSP Journal. After being a resident for so long, it's frustrating.
I'm no lawyer, but I am pretty sure this is morality over legality that swayed the action which prompted this appeal in the first place. It is a serious flaw in the Coalition's meritocracy. I can't serve the SPSF, MoRA or MoFA understandably for past history. But of all places I didn't expect to be denied was the Legislator Committee. It's true my history is not exactly ideal, but if this is the reason why I cannot contribute to the Coalition everytime, what's the point of staying then ?
(06-09-2018, 12:29 PM)Malayan Singapura Wrote: Your honor, this severly infringes on the few rights I am able to exercise. I can't even ask cabinet candidates questions on why they should be elected, or read TSP media that it not the TSP Journal. After being a resident for so long, it's frustrating. The Court has not yet decided to proceed with the appeal on your case. Please only comment if you are going to address the issue of justiciability, at this point in time.
Request for Recusal Whereas Roavin has requested the recusal of Associate Justice Sandaoguo from HCLQ1804, for the purposes of providing expert testimony,
Whereas this Court has conducted a careful review of the merits of such a request on the basis of its legal necessity and potential to impact present and future policies,
It is resolved with respect to this appeal as follows:
Sandaoguo Associate Justice
Your honor,
whilst slightly awkward (which is why I had suggested it), I have no principal issue with you not being recused on this matter. With that being out of the way, could you (in your capacity as Legislator, not as Associate Justice) testify regarding the intent of the restrictions that I mentioned in the previous brief?
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