Well, I don't want someone going around saying, "That's illegal. Why is the PM doing this?"

I don't see how that could be illegal.

Spoiler

Republic of Lansoon (Pacifica)

Reply

I don't see how that could be illegal.

If something is left uncodified, then it could be construed as illegal. If we say, "Oh, the PM can appoint so and so", it becomes, "How? What is the appointment procedure?" Perhaps, we have the appointment clause state, "The prime minister shall have the power to appoint ministers as they deem necessary by any method they so choose." Therefore, they can hold a ministerial election. I wasn't trying to say that we specifically need to say, "They can appoint whatever minister by election."

4× Cabinet minister /// 1× OWL director /// CRS member /// SPSF

My History

Reply

Really, I think an appointment-based system would actually help solve this problem by allowing Ministers to be appointed based on merit and activity, with fewer political considerations (being well-connected, name recognition, etc...) coming into play.

I’m not sure I agree. I think you will find the same advantages and disadvantages both in elections-based and appointments-based systems. I think the main change here is how the Cabinet as an institution works and how its composition facilitates diligent work.

Former Delegate of the South Pacific
Posts outside High Court venues should be taken as those of any other legislator.
I do not participate in the regional server, but I am happy to talk through instant messaging or on the forum.

Legal Resources:
THE MATT-DUCK Law Archive | Mavenu Diplomatic Archive | Rules of the High Court | Case Submission System | Online Rulings Consultation System

Reply

While I do support the idea of an appointment-based cabinet, my primary issue is letting new people a chance into an entry-level cabinet position like Minister of Culture or Engagement that lets them prove their worth to TSP. Personal experience tells me that the same 9 or 10 people will end up in the cabinet over and over again and new people won't have a chance to prove themselves. Working in a ministry consistently won't work with a fluid cabinet that changes every term, so they won't be able to show their dedication to a single ministry. And even then, I find it seriously unlikely that a new Prime Minister would look closely at the activity of all the previous ministries from the old cabinet to discover this new person.

But, yeah, I do generally like the idea of an appointment-based cabinet, it just has some flaws that need to be worked out before I believe it could really be put into practice.

Really, I think an appointment-based system would actually help solve this problem by allowing Ministers to be appointed based on merit and activity, with fewer political considerations (being well-connected, name recognition, etc...) coming into play.

Merit sounds like meritocracy and that doesn't sound good. In my experience with NS meritocracies, usually the same 4 or 5 people end up in power over... and over... and over... and over... and over again until they retire just to get pulled back in again. Everyone says they will be different, and then the same thing happens.

"After he realizes this newfound power of his to override the hopes and dreams of republicans, he puts all of the united provinces under his control."
one time minister of culture

Reply

Okay so.

Now that I'm not falling off my chair from sleep, I went ahead and added more things to the OP. The amendments and the repeals mentioned in the OP are meant to represent our full transition into an appointment-based Cabinet system, from my point of view.

I'll address the points brought up by Kris and others a bit later, need a more coherent mind to do that. I know there's a lot of glaring issues to be found in my proposal, but I think I've got my point across to everyone with it.

Reply

I've taken some time to mull over the idea of an appointed Cabinet, and I'm leaning towards opposing it. It doesn't seem like there have been significant arguments put forth in favor of an elected Cabinet, so I wanted to lay out a few of mine.

Cabinet elections set clear goalposts. For a South Pacifican who, like many of us, discovers an interest in a particular area of government, an elected cabinet system provides greater confidence that they will be able to continue participating in that area. They know that the ministry they're interested in won't be abolished at the whim of a particular Prime Minister. They know that if they have significant ideas to move the ministry forward, they can make the case to their fellow South Pacificans directly. They know that they will remain accountable to their fellow South Pacificans through a consistent and predictable electoral process. In an appointed system, the opposite is true. They are directly accountable to the Prime Minister, who may be leaving office in a few months at most. They know that at that time, they may need to make their case to a new Prime Minister with very different plans for their ministry. And they know that may be the case regardless of how satisfied South Pacificans are with their performance, because there will be many more issues at stake in the Prime Minister elections than a single ministry.

Cabinet elections offer clear pathways to retention. Shifting goalposts don't encourage people to stick around. They don't inspire confidence that continued participation in one's area of interest is viable or guaranteed. Especially without a fixed set of ministries, there is no guarantee that it will even be possible to continue participating in a certain area of government past the end of a term. Fixed goalposts, as offered by Cabinet elections, mean that South Pacificans have a clear reason to stick around, because they know that they will be able to continue doing what they enjoy.

Cabient elections emphasize democracy over efficiency. When we elect our Prime Minister, there is a natural expectation for what can best be described as competency. I've heard this mentioned as an argument in favor of an appointed Cabinet: letting the Prime Minister appoint their Cabinet enables them to actually accomplish their agenda. Naturally, this shifts the balance of accountability: Cabinet ministers answer primarily to the Prime Minister rather than the Assembly;,and the Prime Minister primarily answers to the Assembly on behalf of all their appointed Ministers. This situation places greater emphasis on efficiency and unity in the Cabinet rather than on democracy. Cabinet elections are a deliberate electoral process with an emphasis on plans, goals, and hopes for different parts of our government. Cabinet appointments are a deliberate political process with an emphasis on building a Cabinet that works well together on a common agenda — which is subtly but notably different from building a Cabinet that accurately represents the views of South Pacificans.

Cabinet elections provide voters with more choices. While I'm sure someone will note the number of uncontested Cabinet races we've had, an appointed Cabinet just papers over the cracks. Even if we have more Prime Minister candidates, voters will essentially be choosing between omnibus packages. They may not agree with any Prime Minister candidates in every area, but they will be consciously weighing which candidate they disagree with the least; there is no guarantee the elected Prime Minister will represent the views of the region in each area within their purview. With an elected Cabinet, each individual voter may not see all of their favored candidates win election, but the elected candidates will represent the general will of voters within their particular area of responsibility.

Esfalsa | NationStates | Wiki | Roleplay | Discord

Reply

I have to say I'm personally very uncomfortable with putting this much power into a single pair of hands ‒ especially if we're not providing at least some sort of framework, be it specific ministries or just even broad descriptions of portfolios to be met.

But if we want to go down this path, we should also consider how we'll provide checks and balances against this pretty significant shift of power towards the executive. Assembly confirmation or, more favourably, some sort of challenging mechanism for individual citizens to present themselves as an alternative to the PM's appointment (as Jay proposed), is the bare minimum for me here. For example, I'd say we should definitely also look into term limits (if we actually do implement a blank cheque for the PM, I'd go so far as to say that they shouldn't be able to serve more than one term consecutively), or changing the electoral system to make it harder to be elected with controversial policies.

Reply

Can you elaborate on this? How would it "destabilize the cabinet" and what are the consequences of that?

Several problems with changing ministries:
-if few or no ministries are fixed, is there not a risk in the long term of not having enough ministries in the cabinet?
- if a ministry is created during a mandate, it is not guaranteed that it will continue for the next mandate, for example if its creator is not renewed or if he no longer wishes to have this position. So, can we judge the effectiveness of a ministry if it only exists for 3 or 4 months?
- if someone proposes a ministry project and he has his own ideas to carry it out, what guarantee do we have on the understanding of the PM of this project and does this not risk degrading the relations between the PM and his ministers if they don't always agree?

The purpose of this proposal is to "liberalize" the ministerial functions, whereas on the contrary it would be necessary to reinforce the ministries already existing (by adding the owl to them) by registering their functions and the means they have to carry them out in the charter

I agree with jay coop that our system is too rigid but it is not a good idea to deregulate ministries.

I am not against the idea of ​​a cabinet by appointment but while maintaining the ministries as they are (plus the owl).

(This post was last modified: 07-19-2022, 05:04 AM by Jagged Fel.)

Reply

we should also consider how we'll provide checks and balances against this pretty significant shift of power towards the executive.

I've got a few things which I've mentioned:

Besides motioning a vote of no confidence (which is an extreme case), perhaps codifying an obligation of the Prime Minister (or his appointed subsidiary) to present ''briefings'' to the Assembly on a regular basis.
(...)
Setting the agenda in the campaign would make them more substantial and would provide a good set of standards which both the Assembly and the Prime Minister could judge that specific term by. If the agenda isn't met, the term is judged poorly. However, it also provides a discussion on why the agenda wasn't reached. If the reasons prove to be of systemic nature, it further incentivizes a natural development of The Coalition towards efficiency.

I'd also like to add what I've mentioned to HS during my defense of this type of system,

some systems introduce the procedure of the Legislative regularly asking 'questions' to members of the Executive within the report/briefing communication.

I think this would cover the right to check and balance the PM by the Assembly. However, I believe a check and balance procedure should be given to the WA Delegate towards the PM as well.

The Orange Records | Viliakmon (Pacifica) | NationStates Account Main | Discord: genericsequencealias#0990

Reply

we should also consider how we'll provide checks and balances against this pretty significant shift of power towards the executive.

I've got a few things which I've mentioned:

Besides motioning a vote of no confidence (which is an extreme case), perhaps codifying an obligation of the Prime Minister (or his appointed subsidiary) to present ''briefings'' to the Assembly on a regular basis.
(...)
Setting the agenda in the campaign would make them more substantial and would provide a good set of standards which both the Assembly and the Prime Minister could judge that specific term by. If the agenda isn't met, the term is judged poorly. However, it also provides a discussion on why the agenda wasn't reached. If the reasons prove to be of systemic nature, it further incentivizes a natural development of The Coalition towards efficiency.

I'd also like to add what I've mentioned to HS during my defense of this type of system,

some systems introduce the procedure of the Legislative regularly asking 'questions' to members of the Executive within the report/briefing communication.

I think this would cover the right to check and balance the PM by the Assembly. However, I believe a check and balance procedure should be given to the WA Delegate towards the PM as well.

This is exactly same thing that we do right now.

"After he realizes this newfound power of his to override the hopes and dreams of republicans, he puts all of the united provinces under his control."
one time minister of culture

Reply