It seems this discussion has stalled out a bit, which is rather unfortunate

Yeah, I got a bit busy IRL. Sorry to leave you hanging. I do agree it is rather unfortunate

Overall, I'm not entirely sold, but I do appreciate that you've left room for compromise here.

Beyond the core issue of appointments vs. elections, there's a question of how far to go, so to speak. I know there have been some opinions voiced that the ability for the Prime Minister to flexibly define their appointments is central to how an appointed Cabinet structure would work. I can see the argument that one might make in favor of that system, but am curious if you would consider it a necessity to the operation of an appointed Cabinet (and if so, why?).

Another consideration — I hope this isn't much of a compromise from your vantage point, but I think it would help if PM candidates were required to publish their intended Cabinet nominations/portfolios during the election cycle. It would, at least, keep some of the experience of voting for elected officials with particular areas of responsibility.

Regarding the SPSF — other than who's doing the appointing, what is the functional difference between our existing system for approving appointments, and your proposed system for overturning appointments? Just that someone who the Assembly doesn't want to be come a General would get a few days on the job this way?

It sounds like a trivial semantic difference, but I think these semantic differences do matter when it comes to a debate like this. An appointed Cabinet system (even one with specific ministries established by law) already gives the Prime Minister a much more powerful 'bully pulpit,' especially within a Cabinet that serves at the pleasure of the Prime Minister. Statutory power isn't the end-all-be-all; there are inherent social pressures with someone who is your 'boss' — who can replace you if they desire.

The impressions created by statutory powers is also important. Reading your proposal, the two biggest concerns that popped into my head are:

• Even if you disagree with arguments that an appointed Cabinet concentrates excessive power with the Prime Minister, the perception of how power is concentrated also matters. There's a point where an appointed Cabinet providing "a focus for political energy" turns into providing a focus for political sucking-up, because the law assigns so much power to the Prime Minister specifically.
  
• There's no clear pathway to learn the leadership skills future Prime Ministers will need. If I'm understanding correctly, in your proposal Ministers are effectively serving an administrative role of overseeing one area of Cabinet responsibility, while Prime Ministers are expected to make decisions on the military, World Assembly, proscriptions, and so forth. Not all of these areas of responsibility fall under Cabinet ministers more generally. I'll be the first to recognize that it can feel redundant for the Prime Minister to bring numerous issues to a Cabinet vote just for those issues to often be rubber-stamped, but without offering interested Cabinet members even the opportunity to chime in or see those processes at work, there are limited opportunities for them to experience and learn the decision-making we expect of a Prime Minister.
  

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The impressions created by statutory powers is also important. Reading your proposal, the two biggest concerns that popped into my head are:

• There's no clear pathway to learn the leadership skills future Prime Ministers will need. If I'm understanding correctly, in your proposal Ministers are effectively serving an administrative role of overseeing one area of Cabinet responsibility, while Prime Ministers are expected to make decisions on the military, World Assembly, proscriptions, and so forth. Not all of these areas of responsibility fall under Cabinet ministers more generally. I'll be the first to recognize that it can feel redundant for the Prime Minister to bring numerous issues to a Cabinet vote just for those issues to often be rubber-stamped, but without offering interested Cabinet members even the opportunity to chime in or see those processes at work, there are limited opportunities for them to experience and learn the decision-making we expect of a Prime Minister.
  

I broadly agree with your stance on electing the Cabinet, as opposed to appointing, but I think it’s worth pointing out that I doubt the expectation is for someone to serve a single term as a Minister and then run for the position of Prime Minister. I would imagine the ideal candidate is someone who has served across the Cabinet in a variety of positions, so that they can take a little from each role and coalesce it into a leadership style for the region.

Not that I expect this to be the case, even sporadically. There’s just too few players to make that a viable “career” path.

ProfessorHenn
Legislator

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No comment on the rest from me (for now), but I do have a question regarding this removal:
 

4. Disciplinary Actions

(1) The General Corps is responsible for determining whether a member of the military has conducted themselves in a way not befitting their rank or not befitting their membership in the military. Upon making such a determination, the General Corps will issue one or more disciplinary actions as appropriate, keeping in mind the severity of the infraction and the individual's disciplinary history.

(2) A disciplinary action given to a member of the military can be any one of:
a. Temporary demotion, in which the affected member must serve under a lower effective rank for a duration of up to one month;
b. Indefinite demotion, in which the affected member's effective rank is indefinitely lowered by virtue of no longer meeting rank requirements;
c. Suspension, in which the affected member may not serve the military for a duration of up to one month;
d. Honorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty in good faith;
e. Dishonorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty and not permitted to return without special assent of the Assembly.

(3) A member of the military subject to a disciplinary action may appeal that disciplinary action and offer a defense to be reviewed by the General Corps. If an amicable resolution cannot be achieved, the member may demand that the charge be brought to the High Court. In this case, the court shall conduct a trial akin to a criminal trial, in which General Corps shall act as the Complainant, the accused member as the Accused, and the disciplinary actions listed herein shall be used by the court for sentencing.

What is the logic behind removing this part, and how is it related to moving to an appointed-based cabinet? It seems pretty unrelated, and I don't see any other thread arguing this should be removed.

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Beyond the core issue of appointments vs. elections, there's a question of how far to go, so to speak. I know there have been some opinions voiced that the ability for the Prime Minister to flexibly define their appointments is central to how an appointed Cabinet structure would work. I can see the argument that one might make in favor of that system, but am curious if you would consider it a necessity to the operation of an appointed Cabinet (and if so, why?).

It's not a necessity, imo, but it is a virtue. Who is best for what job(s) in any given administration varies based on a lot of factors. In some administrations, you might have a less experienced individual you want to give leadership over a subset of responsibilities (imagine, for example, you wanted to have a Minister of General Assembly resolutions because there was a newer player who hadn't yet learned the ropes of the WA more broadly) or the opposite and you have a highly capable and active individual you think can take on more responsibility (e.g. an Internal/Regional Affairs minister you want managing both "Culture" and "Integration/Engagement"; you have someone you think can serve as point on both Foreign Affairs and military building; etc.). It can also give the Prime Minister the flexibility to create new Ministries to try out or accomplish specific parts of their vision (e.g. if a Prime Minister thought publications were important and wanted a Media office; if a PM wanted on-site and off-site outreach handled differently; etc.). The options are endless and, ultimately, the PM can explore them in their campaign and then their term. That flexibility actually promotes responsive - and democratic! - government.

I did include in the draft the compromise of "these responsibilities much be addressed by a Cabinet minister" (Article VI(3)) which I think addresses concerns about having no Minister for certain responsibilities without overly limiting the PM's discretion.

Another consideration — I hope this isn't much of a compromise from your vantage point, but I think it would help if PM candidates were required to publish their intended Cabinet nominations/portfolios during the election cycle. It would, at least, keep some of the experience of voting for elected officials with particular areas of responsibility.

Eh, I have mixed thoughts on this. On the one hand, I like the idea as it promotes both PM flexibility and democratic accountability. On the other hand, it creates weird incentives (what if you want to include your opponent in your Cabinet? what if you are approached to be in Cabinet but want the other candidate to win, so you decline a position because you don't want to make your less preferred candidate look "good"?). I also worry it would put candidates under a very tight time crunch (before you declare your candidacy, you not only have to identify your Cabinet but also secure different Cabinet ministers saying "yes" to taking a Cabinet post). I think it's just easier to leave it in the realm of "if a PM wanted to publish their Cabinet, they can, but we can't regulate that they have to". I'm willing to be convinced here.

Regarding the SPSF — other than who's doing the appointing, what is the functional difference between our existing system for approving appointments, and your proposed system for overturning appointments? Just that someone who the Assembly doesn't want to be come a General would get a few days on the job this way?

It sounds like a trivial semantic difference, but I think these semantic differences do matter when it comes to a debate like this. An appointed Cabinet system (even one with specific ministries established by law) already gives the Prime Minister a much more powerful 'bully pulpit,' especially within a Cabinet that serves at the pleasure of the Prime Minister. Statutory power isn't the end-all-be-all; there are inherent social pressures with someone who is your 'boss' — who can replace you if they desire.

From my point of view, if the structure of the military is as it is now it makes sense that Generals have to be confirmed by the Assembly, because the Generals have authority in and of themselves to govern the SPSF. (Arguably, in the status quo the PM actually has no authority to direct the SPSF! And Generals also have the authority to override the MoD/govern jointly with the MoD.) In a PM-led model, the PM is the one with the responsibility and who provides civilian oversight, not the Assembly, and this removes the need for confirmation. Despite this, the element of recall can/should remain, as the most direct avenue for public oversight of any given official.

Another element of what I did was remove the distinction between Generals and Commanders. I'll be honest, part of this is because of my reflections on the SPSF's structure more broadly: there's no difference between the roles in practice. They hold similar levels of expertise and involvement in day-to-day operations. In theory, the distinction is that Generals are given actual administrative authority and thus are confirmed by the Assembly. If the General Corps itself no longer has authority not derived from the PM, there is no need for a distinction and all Commanders can be Generals (or we can call them Commanders! I don't particularly care...).

The draft does contain a provision which forbids the PM from dismissing a General or Officer for advising against a course of action the PM takes, unless they interfere in an operation. This gives a meaningful protection against abuse of power and retaliation against the long-term professionalized officer corps of the military.

Even if you disagree with arguments that an appointed Cabinet concentrates excessive power with the Prime Minister, the perception of how power is concentrated also matters. There's a point where an appointed Cabinet providing "a focus for political energy" turns into providing a focus for political sucking-up, because the law assigns so much power to the Prime Minister specifically.

This assumes we have Prime Ministers with long terms and no political complications. In practice, especially with three month terms, people who disagree with the Prime Minister actually have the viable route of running for Prime Minister on the next cycle and outlining the areas of their disagreement. People are unlikely to direct all their energy into sucking up to the PM because they'll only be PM for so long. Not to mention, there will be other ways of demonstrating one's worth/building one's resume, such as sub-Cabinet ministry work and legislative work.

There's no clear pathway to learn the leadership skills future Prime Ministers will need. If I'm understanding correctly, in your proposal Ministers are effectively serving an administrative role of overseeing one area of Cabinet responsibility, while Prime Ministers are expected to make decisions on the military, World Assembly, proscriptions, and so forth. Not all of these areas of responsibility fall under Cabinet ministers more generally. I'll be the first to recognize that it can feel redundant for the Prime Minister to bring numerous issues to a Cabinet vote just for those issues to often be rubber-stamped, but without offering interested Cabinet members even the opportunity to chime in or see those processes at work, there are limited opportunities for them to experience and learn the decision-making we expect of a Prime Minister.

I think you're overstating how important involvement in those processes is for Cabinet ministers to learn/prepare for potentially being Prime Minister - they're actually a relatively small part of the job. They're legal powers of the Cabinet, but they're not central to being an effective leader. I also think that, in all likelihood, PMs would still involve the Cabinet in those decisions, just in an informal/consultative manner instead of in a formal voting process. In all honesty, the degree of involvement may be better since it will occur as more of a conversation and less of a "here's this thing, vote Yes!" (which is the status quo). Not to mention, I think all Legislators can/should/do have opinions about these things, and at times express them, and thus are already involved in the process of rationalizing these decisions.

What is the logic behind removing this part, and how is it related to moving to an appointed-based cabinet? It seems pretty unrelated, and I don't see any other thread arguing this should be removed.

Yeah, I thought about this and am willing to be persuaded otherwise. If the military is placed under the unitary executive authority of the PM, then they make the determinations about personnel. Having a defined set of punishments or disciplinary process based in consent of the Generals just isn't a super relevant concept anymore. Not to mention, in practice in the status quo, this process is rarely used (I believe it has been used twice in history: once to formally discharge Islas after they had already left the Discord server and once to demote Melix as Officer for a week mere days before his administrative ban). So, I don't even think we're losing too much by streamlining the process. That said, we can keep it if people want to.

Minister of Foreign Affairs
General of the South Pacific Special Forces
Ambassador to Balder
Former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense

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I think we're running around in circles about whether to appoint or elect the Cabinet. Perhaps, we could have a poll of sorts to gauge opinion on which to pursue?

4× Cabinet minister /// 1× OWL director /// CRS member /// SPSF

My History

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I think we're running around in circles about whether to appoint or elect the Cabinet. Perhaps, we could have a poll of sorts to gauge opinion on which to pursue?

I feel like we're actually being pretty productive in discussing proposal texts and specific components of how it would work. I think it would be best to allow this discussion to play out a bit more and then hold a vote on a specific proposal/idea

Minister of Foreign Affairs
General of the South Pacific Special Forces
Ambassador to Balder
Former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense

(This post was last modified: 08-02-2022, 10:59 AM by HumanSanity.)

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There's a huge difference in moving to an appointed Cabinet and pretty much centralising everything in the PM, and based on this draft you seem to have gone for the later and then turned it up to eleven.

_{Minister of Media, Subversion and Sandwich Making}
^{Associate Justice of the High Court and Senior Moderator}

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There's a huge difference in moving to an appointed Cabinet and pretty much centralising everything in the PM, and based on this draft you seem to have gone for the later and then turned it up to eleven.

Yes, my draft centralizes all authority in the PM. Saying "omg you gave the PM lots of authority!!!" is not a response unless you have a reason why a specific authority I gave the PM is "too much".

If you have an argument, say it instead of snark posting.

Minister of Foreign Affairs
General of the South Pacific Special Forces
Ambassador to Balder
Former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense

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I did include in the draft the compromise of "these responsibilities much be addressed by a Cabinet minister" (Article VI(3)) which I think addresses concerns about having no Minister for certain responsibilities without overly limiting the PM's discretion.

Hmm, I see. I think I read that with the assumption that the Prime Minister was themselves a Minister as well, but I'm sure we can smooth out kinks in wording like this. Semantically, I do think it would make more sense for the Prime Minister to be a member of the Cabinet if they are meant to be the leader of it.

From my point of view, if the structure of the military is as it is now it makes sense that Generals have to be confirmed by the Assembly, because the Generals have authority in and of themselves to govern the SPSF. (Arguably, in the status quo the PM actually has no authority to direct the SPSF! And Generals also have the authority to override the MoD/govern jointly with the MoD.) In a PM-led model, the PM is the one with the responsibility and who provides civilian oversight, not the Assembly, and this removes the need for confirmation. Despite this, the element of recall can/should remain, as the most direct avenue for public oversight of any given official.

Is this the point of view you hold more generally? The Prime Minister is the leader of the Cabinet, but Cabinet minister nominations must be confirmed, so I'm not entirely sure why being the commander-in-chief of the SPSF means there's no need for confirmation.

I also think that, in all likelihood, PMs would still involve the Cabinet in those decisions, just in an informal/consultative manner instead of in a formal voting process.

I'm fine with informal consultation, as long as it actually happens. I wouldn't even mind if it was codified into law that the Prime Minister must consult with the Cabinet or something, even if that still leaves the door open to varying degrees of consultation, because I do think it is important to at least establish the intent of the Cabinet as an advisory body. With your proposal, the language introducing the appointed Minister positions is oriented around the particular areas of executive responsibility that they must fulfill. That's fine, but I do think the Cabinet can and should do more than just being "responsible for" certain areas of government. I'm sure that what I'm pointing out wasn't your intention with the language — but I do think the language, as it currently stands, overemphasizes the Prime Minister as a decision-maker and other Ministers as administrators. If we really are going to follow through with an appointed Cabinet, I'd really prefer to see it at least established, in the law, as not just as a way for a Prime Minister to pick like-minded people to carry out their agenda, but also to identify people who may serve as good advisors and voices in internal conversations.

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Highest Order Announcement, enacted by A Bee, power and position which I've bestowed upon myself in the name of the public interest.

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Dear Legislators and visitors/registered voters/citizens/residents,
I hereby announce the end of the GC as all discussions are either moving towards a PM Dictatorship or about what to do with the LC - who does nothing but pretend to moderate the RMB. This suggests that we should also abolish The Coalition.

In the name of myself, I hereby announce the end of The Coalition of the South Pacific. All laws, including the Charter, cease to be enforced as of this announcement. All power is given to The Delegate as well Honorary Delegates, a title of former Delegates which may be given by the incumbent one. All future policies will now be enacted on discretion of The Delegate via ''Decrees''. Any disobedience is met with immediate expulsion from all TSP communities.

-Yours faithfully, A bee.

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Note: This is clearly a an exaggerated, satirical approach to giving criticism of the current discussions and the state of GC as a whole.

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