This is exactly same thing that we do right now.

We do none of this now. The PM is just a coordinating figure in the Cabinet. Giving power to the PM would make regular reports and questions concerning progress to the PM's set agenda naturally consistent (hence why I just wanted to codify it, as I can see already that it'll become a common procedure).
We don't discuss why 'x' has failed, we don't have a criteria by which a PM's term can objectively be judged. Instead it's just a vague assessment. This way, you have criteria, set by the PM themselves, which if aren't met lead to discussion on why it hasn't been met. It allows, to paraphrase myself, a natural progression of the Coalition towards efficiency.

Still, I want to see suggestions on how the WA would (or even should) hold the PM accountable and by which mechanisms.

The Orange Records | Viliakmon (Pacifica) | NationStates Account Main | Discord: genericsequencealias#0990

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Still, I want to see suggestions on how the WA would (or even should) hold the PM accountable and by which mechanisms.

What does the WA have to do with the Prime Minister?

Former Delegate of the South Pacific
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This is exactly same thing that we do right now.

We do none of this now. The PM is just a coordinating figure in the Cabinet. Giving power to the PM would make regular reports and questions concerning progress to the PM's set agenda naturally consistent (hence why I just wanted to codify it, as I can see already that it'll become a common procedure).
We don't discuss why 'x' has failed, we don't have a criteria by which a PM's term can objectively be judged. Instead it's just a vague assessment. This way, you have criteria, set by the PM themselves, which if aren't met lead to discussion on why it hasn't been met. It allows, to paraphrase myself, a natural progression of the Coalition towards efficiency.

Still, I want to see suggestions on how the WA would (or even should) hold the PM accountable and by which mechanisms.

It appears that what I referenced is not codified into law, but we do it anyways. Or at least, I know we did it 2 terms ago and I am pretty sure it was done for some of the last term as well. Your issue is that you haven't been here long enough to see a cabinet that consistently did it. While I do agree with codifying that the cabinet should do that, I disagree with mandating what should be in people's campaigns. If they don't put things that satisfy the voters, then they don't get elected.

Also what does the WA have to do with anything?

"After he realizes this newfound power of his to override the hopes and dreams of republicans, he puts all of the united provinces under his control."
one time minister of culture

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One of the assumed benefit of this model is an increase in synergy between the ministers and the PM. Can supporters of this model give me a couple of examples on how the current way of doing it limits the synergy between PM and ministers? As far as I understand, we don’t really have any problem related to the ministers not working well with each other. It seems like the main failure of many cabinets lies at setting high expectations then failing to meet expectations and poor communication with the public rather than any infighting/instability.

Chief Supervising Armchair

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Only issue I have is cabinet members like Minister of Defense might be better served by a voting public familiar with the SPSF than a random appointment by a well deserving new Prime minister having spent no time following or being involved in or with SPSF activities and not knowing a worthy appointment. MoFA is another branch that needs the right person a new Prime Minister might not know

Real-life Girls

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Only issue I have is cabinet members like Minister of Defense might be better served by a voting public familiar with the SPSF than a random appointment by a well deserving new Prime minister having spent no time following or being involved in or with SPSF activities and not knowing a worthy appointment. MoFA is another branch that needs the right person a new Prime Minister might not know

This may perhaps be solved with how it works in many real militaries - there is a professional head of the army/military (usually the most senior general/admiral, eg. the First Sea Lord) who is chosen or appointed by the Generals, and then the Minister of Defence, which is usually a political figure who is part of the cabinet. That way, there's always someone at the head of the organisation who has the most experience in running it even if the Minister has no experience with the position at all, and if the Prime Minister just doesn't have any idea who they should put as the Minister, they can chose that professional head (though I don't think the latter happens very often irl, but it would be quite useful here).

I would also like to say that whichever way this goes, I don't think it's a particularly good idea to completely remove any mention in law relating to how our military or foreign affairs ministry is run. The SPSF and MoFA very much depend on having laws which guarantee their existence and also set out rules for how they are run, especially regarding the Military Code (which set out some pretty important details regarding rules, disciplinary action and the structure of the SPSF)  and what powers the MoFA has regarding treaties and foreign relations. I get that most Prime Ministers will want to keep these ministries in place, but these Ministries are still too important to simply trust the Prime Minister at the time to not use their practically unlimited power to do whatever they want with them, and it would just be much more reassuring on all sides (domestically and abroad) if they remained as law. I think it'd be feasible to do this for the other ministries, though, as they aren't essential to national security in the same way.

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It doesn't seem like there have been significant arguments put forth in favor of an elected Cabinet, so I wanted to lay out a few of mine.

Let's fix that, shall we.

It allows a unified agenda. In TSP elections, we're used to hearing PMs say "we'll have a unified, published, super swag Cabinet agenda". It never happens. It's not because the PMs are always bad PMs, it's because the system structurally prevents you having a unified agenda. In regions, every function is interlinked. "Engagement" is ultimately promoting every other branch of government, "culture" exists in the context of foreign affairs events, foreign affairs serves the needs of the SPSF and vice versa, the SPSF relies on engagement to get new Soldiers, WA functions are essentially an outgrowth of FA ones, etc. As it is now, each Minister is elected with their own agenda, and even if the PM gives orders, the Ministers will generally prioritize their own agenda over the collective agenda for the region, in part because it's what they signed up to do. Any ability to move the region forward is lost.

It allows the government to meet the needs of the moment. The needs of the region's executive are constantly changing, far faster than the Assembly can (or should) move to change the structure of individual Ministries. If a PM runs on a unified vision for the region's government, and all its component parts, they can both select Ministers and Ministries to meet those needs. This avoids a situation where our Ministries are essentially stalled out, shackled by old responsibility sets, etc.

It's more efficient. There are always barriers to effective government in NS. Often times, they're in-game, and other times they're out-of-game factors influencing in-game events. Staying on top of things requires fast reactions and efficiency - the ability to say "this person isn't getting the job done, we need someone new". In the status quo, the PM doesn't have that power. Unless something extraordinary happens which rises to the level of a recall, the PM is stuck with the Minister and has to deal with their refusal to work towards the PM's actual agenda. This doesn't work, it costs the government valuable time, and demotivates government officials themselves.

Ministers are selected for the job they need to do, not another job. Right now, Ministers aren't selected for the job the PM needs them to do. They're selected for the job they chose to do. Only top-down selection-power over the Cabinet actually causes Ministers to think "do I want to do the job as the PM has outlined it in their campaign and deliver on those promises?" as opposed to "do I want to do this thing?".

It provides a focus for political energy. Right now, in order to hold any part of the executive accountable, the Assembly has to look seven different places, blame is shifted around, and there's frankly no one the buck stops with. Of course, we say the buck stops with the PM, but I don't think this is true in practice. Often, blame is deflected to every other official on the list except the PM, in part because the PM has no actual control. Having a unitary executive is actually better for producing a robust democracy because it provides a focus for player aspirations, attention, praise, and criticism. Right now, no election is genuinely exciting because the difference between the candidates is often a small difference in ideas rather than a sweepingly different vision, because there's only so much they can do. And, honestly, the limited power and capability of the PM probably explains why so few people want the job: it's basically a useless job that doesn't let you do anything. A difference of vision between candidates with comprehensive visions for the entire region is a better contrast for producing a healthy internal democracy and electoral cycle as well as interest in the position.

It's better for mentorship. Direct appointment is actually better for plucking new members out of obscurity and giving them a chance. In an elected system, a new player always loses to an incumbent. Or, no credible candidate runs, so the version of "giving a new player a chance" is to give the office to someone with likely no promise. Frankly, many new players who have promise are also skeptical of themselves, and won't believe in themselves unless someone points to them and says "you, yes you, should step up to the plate". Instead, new players who have little potential and lots of arrogance step up. Not only are new players with actual promise likely to become Minister but there's a structure for mentorship that they will feel more comfortable using, as reaching out to someone who has invested political energy into selecting you for office for help is far more likely.

The power of the lean. One of the best ways to get people in NS to do things is a direct personal ask. The abstract of the region wanting you to do a job is not the same as the direct ask or request of the PM saying "I want you for this job, here's why, and here's how I'll support you in doing that". It's better for properly staffing our Ministries and keeping people involved.

I'll also answer your arguments:

For a South Pacifican who, like many of us, discovers an interest in a particular area of government, an elected cabinet system provides greater confidence that they will be able to continue participating in that area. They know that the ministry they're interested in won't be abolished at the whim of a particular Prime Minister.

If an area of government proves itself helpful, it's unlikely to be abolished. And promising to abolish it would be a major campaign issue for the Prime Minister. It's a self correcting issue. If a PM starts abolishing Ministries on a whim, they will face huge outcry and likely recall by the Assembly. Lastly, a PM would still have to fulfill particular functions of government to maintain credibility, so at worst staff would be reorganized in most cases. Also, for internal functions, they can simply privatize the effort (as we've seen with the Ministry of Media).

They know that if they have significant ideas to move the ministry forward, they can make the case to their fellow South Pacificans directly. They know that they will remain accountable to their fellow South Pacificans through a consistent and predictable electoral process. In an appointed system, the opposite is true. They are directly accountable to the Prime Minister, who may be leaving office in a few months at most. They know that at that time, they may need to make their case to a new Prime Minister with very different plans for their ministry.

If a Minister is making progress in a Ministry, then a Prime Minister will likely retain them. If they aren't, then they won't. It's the same as under an election system, it only changes who they are accountable to to a more efficient system.

And they know that may be the case regardless of how satisfied South Pacificans are with their performance, because there will be many more issues at stake in the Prime Minister elections than a single ministry.

To some extent, this is actually a good thing. Right now, our government functions are too silo'd instead of being unified, which prevents PMs moving the entire region forward, as opposed to just some of its parts.

Cabinet elections offer clear pathways to retention. [...]

This is mostly a repetition of the previous point

This situation places greater emphasis on efficiency and unity in the Cabinet rather than on democracy. Cabinet elections are a deliberate electoral process with an emphasis on plans, goals, and hopes for different parts of our government. Cabinet appointments are a deliberate political process with an emphasis on building a Cabinet that works well together on a common agenda — which is subtly but notably different from building a Cabinet that accurately represents the views of South Pacificans.

On the contrary, a Cabinet elected individually doesn't represent South Pacifican views for comprehensive government. It represents what South Pacificans want for a predetermined set of individual parts. Frankly, it makes the choice for South Pacificans that they want a disunified government, which isn't necessarily the case.

Even beyond that, it begs why democratic input at that particular step is valuable. If democracy was our sole value, we would simply abolish the Charter as is and the Assembly would decide every issue by majority vote. But we don't do that, because practicality, security, efficiency, and effectiveness are all factors as well. Shifting where democratic accountability is applied doesn't eliminate that accountability.

Also, confirmations by the Assembly check any kind of runaway abuse by the PM.

Cabinet elections provide voters with more choices. While I'm sure someone will note the number of uncontested Cabinet races we've had, an appointed Cabinet just papers over the cracks. Even if we have more Prime Minister candidates, voters will essentially be choosing between omnibus packages. They may not agree with any Prime Minister candidates in every area, but they will be consciously weighing which candidate they disagree with the least; there is no guarantee the elected Prime Minister will represent the views of the region in each area within their purview. With an elected Cabinet, each individual voter may not see all of their favored candidates win election, but the elected candidates will represent the general will of voters within their particular area of responsibility.

Again, this assumes the region has discrete parts that operate entirely autonomously from one another instead of as a unified vision with individual parts. Sure, it decreases the amount of control that voters have over each part of the agenda, but it gives them a say in what the entire agenda should be, which is honestly more important for the long-term direction of the region.

As a related point of criticism, none of your justifications actually outline what the role of the PM should be under an elected Cabinet system.

Minister of Foreign Affairs
General of the South Pacific Special Forces
Ambassador to Balder
Former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense

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It doesn't seem like there have been significant arguments put forth in favor of an elected Cabinet, so I wanted to lay out a few of mine.

Let's fix that, shall we.

Well, first of all, I am glad you fixed it

If you'll forgive me for oversimplifying a bit, almost all of your points seem to coalesce around a desire for a more efficient executive. An unified agenda... so the Cabinet can operate more efficiently. More flexible structure... so the Cabinet can operate more efficiently. A faster process for replacing Ministers... so the Cabinet can operate more efficiently. See where I'm going?

Your response to my concerns about emphasizing efficiency over democracy addresses the democracy aspect, but doesn't particularly extoll the virtues of efficiency either. Why is efficiency in particular such a critical virtue for the executive to hold? Why is it so important that the executive always have a comprehensive, singularly-defined agenda to accomplish as effectively as possible? I know it all looks good on paper, but the same could be said of many other virtues. Why this one in particular?

To lay out some of my hesitations with embracing efficiency as our primary goal with the executive, I'll refer back to my previous example of a newcomer who discovers an interest in a particular area of government. They start getting involved, they start forming their own ideas, and they start voicing them. And... then what? Suck up to the Prime Minister? Start criticizing them publicly? There's no direct link between each Ministry and the Assembly. Members of each ministry are held accountable by the Minister, who is held accountable by the Prime Minister, who is held accountable by the Assembly. An appointment system creates an additional level of hierarchy, which one may argue is necessary for more efficient government, but it's another layer of hierarchy that people and ideas have to go through.

An appointed Cabinet implies a top-down mindset, built around established figures: the Assembly elects someone for their overall vision, and that person fills out the rest of their structure from top to bottom. An elected Cabinet implies a bottom-up mindset, built around newer figures: the Assembly elects people for their ideas in a specific area, and those people work together as the Cabinet.

When our newcomer finds themselves at the bottom of a top-down system, their options get limited. They can hope to get plucked out of obscurity and get the kind of mentorship that an elected Cabinet structure can't provide. Or maybe they can go and criticize the Prime Minister in the Assembly, in the hopes that someone else eyeing the Prime Minister position will take note and remember them if they're elected. But you know what's much harder to do? Take their case to the Assembly themselves. They can't simply go to the Assembly, lay out their ideas, and explain why they are the best candidate to lead their ministry. And they can't simply legislate some changes to how their ministry operates, lest that defeat the entire purpose of giving the Prime Minister such broad leeway to determine how ministries are run.

One might argue this is for the better. A newcomer like this might be well-intentioned, but have little understanding of how their particular area of interest is actually interlinked with many other parts of government. And so what? If you ask me, it's much better to let them get more involved and gain more exposure to other aspects of our region than to simply tell them to go get more involved elsewhere first. Only one of these approaches develops interest organically. And don't get me wrong — I do believe that the way some of our ministries are organized are fundamentally flawed. That doesn't mean codifying our ministries into law is a recipe for disunified government. I just think that not every South Pacifican has detailed views for comprehensive government. But our newcomer might be taking their first step towards developing the broader and deeper understanding of regional politics that will lead to a more comprehensive perspective.

Democracy is about more than accountability. It's about ideas. Democracy may be kept in check by voters holding their elected officials accountable, but it's powered by the ideas those voters put forth and, especially here in our community, by those voters being willing to take a leap and seek election themselves.

A more 'grassroots' (I'm using the term a bit broadly, I admit) approach doesn't mean the Prime Minister has no meaningful job. They get to be responsible for "the overall coordination of executive activities, being a liaison between the government and the community, and protecting the Coalition!" No. I'm kidding. I admit that our current Charter can be a bit... unhelpful. But the Prime Minister does have a bully pulpit, a means to make themselves heard. You mention that oftentimes, "we say the buck stops with the PM." But the Prime Minister doesn't have to accept that. If there's anything that the number of people supporting an appointed Cabinet should show, it's that people recognize a primus inter pares may not hold much more power de jure than their counterparts. But it is also true that the Prime Minister holds the greatest visibility in the Cabinet. If they answer to the Assembly most directly, there's no obligation to defend every the work of their Cabinet in every aspect. They can report on the performance of different parts of government and provide insight, from their uniquely high-level perspective, to inform the Assembly of the overall state of the executive. Sometimes, that may include a ministry that is slipping, or a minister who is pursuing their own ideas perhaps a bit too stubbornly without consulting others. It's not a reflection on the Prime Minister — the interplay between ministries is something the Prime Minister is uniquely positioned to understand, and their insight can and should provide valuable insight into Assembly discussions.

Esfalsa | NationStates | Wiki | Roleplay | Discord

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If you'll forgive me for oversimplifying a bit, almost all of your points seem to coalesce around a desire for a more efficient executive.

This oversimplifies my points a lot. "Efficiency" is only one way of ensuring effective governance, although it is an important one. Governance is also about outreach, setting and meeting goals, ensuring next generations are available to take on leadership, and being responsive to the concerns of the citizenry. All of these are goals better accomplished via an appointment-based system, for the reasons I explained above. Of course, you acknowledge some of that later, but your broad framing of "well, you only said efficiency, and democracy > efficiency" is inaccurate.

Why is efficiency in particular such a critical virtue for the executive to hold? Why is it so important that the executive always have a comprehensive, singularly-defined agenda to accomplish as effectively as possible?

1. Why should we have an 'executive' at all? Glen actually floated a proposal a while ago via Discord as a thought experiment to simply transfer all governance to the Assembly and abolish the Cabinet and the executive. Then, democracy can flourish. Ideas can flourish. Individual parts of the government can be tweaked at will. The reason not to do this is mass inefficiency and lack of a singular vision, infighting or just apathy begins to consume government, and as a result people become disengaged and apathy sets in. Of course, elected Ministers is a mid-point between these extremes, but the extreme example demonstrates that efficiency does matter.

We don't prioritize efficiency over everything. The Prime Minister should still be elected and their Ministry appointments should still have to be confirmed. The Prime Minister should also be able to be recalled for neglect, abuse of power, etc. However it's silly to say efficiency doesn't matter. The executive identifying and then accomplishing its tasks is the primary goal of the executive, otherwise there's no reason for it to exist.

2. An effective executive is key to the long-term success of the region. What is the goal here? From my perspective, the goal of everything we do is to create a South Pacific that is sovereign, strong, free, fun to be in, able to identify its own goals, and then advocate for them interregionally. Every piece of that is important. Sovereign and strong institutions bounded by liberal democratic ideas is the baseline thing that must be protected at all costs, but beyond that things are about allowing the region to not just survive but thrive. A fun region, with clearly identified goals, and the capability to advocate for them interregionally requires a unified executive, with a single agenda, and all the pieces working in unison. Right now, that is impossible. With a singular head of government, it is at least possible, and then its failure to exist can allow someone to be held accountable.

They start getting involved, they start forming their own ideas, and they start voicing them. And... then what? Suck up to the Prime Minister? Start criticizing them publicly? There's no direct link between each Ministry and the Assembly. Members of each ministry are held accountable by the Minister, who is held accountable by the Prime Minister, who is held accountable by the Assembly. An appointment system creates an additional level of hierarchy, which one may argue is necessary for more efficient government, but it's another layer of hierarchy that people and ideas have to go through.

I think you overstate the burden that this would impose on new members. Inside of Ministries, staffers can say "what if we organized things X way". If it's an idea that is compatible with the Prime Minister's broader vision, it may get implemented! If it's not, then they have to wait for the next election when they can raise that question to Prime Ministerial candidates. There's not as many disjoints or disconnects as you think. The same step (waiting for the next election) exists under your system as well and people can still post or advocate ideas as a member of the public, regardless of if they're legislatively based.

Also, I'm considering floating an 'Assembly Committees' idea that may address some of this issue. Watch this space ™

A more 'grassroots' (I'm using the term a bit broadly, I admit) approach doesn't mean the Prime Minister has no meaningful job. They get to be responsible for "the overall coordination of executive activities, being a liaison between the government and the community, and protecting the Coalition!" No. I'm kidding. I admit that our current Charter can be a bit... unhelpful. But the Prime Minister does have a bully pulpit, a means to make themselves heard. You mention that oftentimes, "we say the buck stops with the PM." But the Prime Minister doesn't have to accept that. If there's anything that the number of people supporting an appointed Cabinet should show, it's that people recognize a primus inter pares may not hold much more power de jure than their counterparts. But it is also true that the Prime Minister holds the greatest visibility in the Cabinet. If they answer to the Assembly most directly, there's no obligation to defend every the work of their Cabinet in every aspect. They can report on the performance of different parts of government and provide insight, from their uniquely high-level perspective, to inform the Assembly of the overall state of the executive. Sometimes, that may include a ministry that is slipping, or a minister who is pursuing their own ideas perhaps a bit too stubbornly without consulting others. It's not a reflection on the Prime Minister — the interplay between ministries is something the Prime Minister is uniquely positioned to understand, and their insight can and should provide valuable insight into Assembly discussions.

This is the problem. The Prime Minister is honestly less powerful than individual Ministers because they have no authority over specific areas. They have communication responsibilities and a vague mandate to serve as head of government. But they are not actually the head of the government. They do not pick the government. They do not pick the government's agenda. They have little to no recourse if Cabinet Members do not do their jobs.

You say the Prime Minister can serve as "primus inter pares". If that's the case, the PM can be selected from within the Cabinet rather than being a separate elected position. If their role is only clerical, it does not actually need its own person in the Cabinet. Beyond that, it assumes the Cabinet should be a body of equals rather than a body with hierarchy. That introduces all of the inefficiencies we've seen weighing down TSP's executive government for years.

I also can't say I really want a political dynamic where the executive is constantly shifting blame between one another. That's internally divisive and doesn't actually accomplish things. Not to mention, it's not how the position is framed to work now, as it's in contrast to the PM as head of government or the notion of Cabinet collective responsibility.

I'll be very blunt: I have a term and a half as PM under my belt. I don't think it's too much ego to say I was a fairly strong PM, both in terms of accomplishments and in terms of my willingness and ability to use the role as a "bully pulpit" of sorts who attempts to take genuine leadership over the Cabinet. I don't know why anyone would want to be PM and I sincerely doubt I'd run again under its current set up. It's a job where you have to deal with every problem in the region but don't actually have the tools to do so. The only power you have to shape the region is to be proactive and loud in discussions and do communications and paperwork. In effect, however, you have very little power to shape the outcomes in the region during your term because you don't set the agenda or the team who will accomplish it.

We often bemoan the lack of candidates in our elections. Have we considered it's because the jobs we're electing people for aren't worth running for and therefore people don't aspire for them? No seriously. What new member of the region thinks to themselves "some day I'd like to be PM, that person seems like they get to get things done and implement their vision for the region"?

The answer is none. Because the PM is a useless toothless job in the status quo. And that fact is hurting the region's growth and ability to function.

Minister of Foreign Affairs
General of the South Pacific Special Forces
Ambassador to Balder
Former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense

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It seems this discussion has stalled out a bit, which is rather unfortunate considering the discussion behind the actual reasoning for this proposal is just getting started.

That said, I want to give us something more to work with for discussion (and eventually voting) purposes. I'm not super happy with how Moon's redrafts to the Charter, etc. are working, in large part because I think they're still trapped by the vestiges of a collective responsibility Cabinet rather than a singular unitary executive. I also think it's important to provide space for some of the compromise ideas that have been discussed here to be included in the draft.

I'll also note that I've included the shift to a three month term rather than a four month term in this draft.

So, here goes.

The Charter of the Coalition of the South Pacific

[...]

VI. THE EXECUTIVE

Establishing the executive authority of the Coalition an executive branch consisting of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

(1) The primary executive authority of the Coalition will be the Prime Minister, who shall serve as the head of government. They will be responsible for the coordination and execution of executive activities, ensuring communication between the executive and the community, and the protection of the community.

(2) The Prime Minister shall serve a term of three months. The date, time, and manner of elections will be set by the Assembly in a law.

(3) The Prime Minister shall, upon their election as Prime Minister, nominate a Cabinet of Ministers to assist in the execution of the region's government. The responsibilities and portfolio of each Minister shall be at the discretion of the Prime Minister, however they at minimum must name Ministers responsible for the region's foreign affairs, military, cultural activities, and outreach and integration efforts. Before assuming office, Ministers must be confirmed by the Assembly in a vote lasting not longer than 48 hours.

(1) The Prime Minister will be the head of government and the leader of the Cabinet. They will be responsible for the overall coordination of executive activities, being a liaison between the government and the community, and protecting the Coalition.

(2) The Cabinet will consist of ministers with the following portfolios: Foreign Affairs, Culture, Engagement, and Defense.

(3) As leader of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister is responsible for overseeing a collective Cabinet agenda, and may give directions and instructions to the ministers. Disputes within the Cabinet are subject to the majority decision and collective responsibility; where there is no majority the Prime Minister’s vote shall be the deciding one.

(4) The Office of World Assembly Legislation will be a permanent executive office, which will be led by a Director, responsible for coordinating the Coalition's activities in the World Assembly, providing assistance in drafting resolutions, and issuing voting recommendations on World Assembly proposals. At the start of each Cabinet term, the Director will be appointed by the Prime Minister for a term coinciding with the Cabinet's. In any vacancy, a new Director will be appointed by the Prime Minister to serve the remainder of the term.

(5) (4) Members of the Executive are required to hold legislator status.

Elections

(6) Executive elections will be held every four months, where the Prime Minister and all Cabinet positions will be up for election.

(7) The date, time, and manner of elections will be set by the Assembly in a law.

Minister of Culture

(8) The Minister of Culture will be responsible for supporting the roleplay community and organizing regional cultural activities, events, and exchanges.

Minister of Engagement

(9) The Minister of Engagement will be responsible for recruiting and integrating new players into the Coalition's government and community, maintaining public infrastructure such as dispatches and other guides, setting unified presentation standards, and providing graphics to the government and citizens of the Coalition.

Minister of Foreign Affairs

(10) The Minister of Foreign Affairs will be the Coalition’s chief diplomat. They will be responsible for establishing the government’s foreign policy program, communicating with allies, and coordinating with the military on foreign policy priorities when necessary.

(11) The Minister of Foreign Affairs holds the sole power to initiate treaty negotiations with other regions, groups, and organizations, but may designate officers to handle those negotiations. Upon completion of a treaty negotiation, the Minister must present it to the full executive for majority approval, before submitting it to the Assembly for ratification.

(12) The Minister of Foreign Affairs will be responsible for establishing standards for the creation and maintenance of consulates and embassies.

Minister of Defense

(13) The Minister of Defense will be the civilian leader of the armed forces of the Coalition, the South Pacific Special Forces. In conjunction with a group of Generals, the Minister of Defense will be responsible for the defense of the Coalition, building military activity, and conducting military operations.

(14) The Minister of Defense may elect to establish an intelligence office, in equal coordination with the Council on Regional Security.

Executive Authorities

(6) The Prime Minister shall hold the authority to appoint members of their Cabinet, subject to majority confirmation by the Assembly, and the authority to dismiss members of their Cabinet at will.

(7) The Prime Minister shall serve as the chief diplomat of the region in external affairs. The Prime Minister shall exercise the sole authority to initiate treaty negotiations with foreign regions, to build and demolish embassies on-site, to determine the foreign policy agenda of the Coalition, and to communicate with the region's allies and partners. The Prime Minister may delegate these authorities at their discretion, but retains ultimate oversight and authority over these decisions.

(8) The Prime Minister shall serve as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Coalition, subject to limitations prescribed by the Charter and in laws. While the Prime Minister will serve as the ultimate decider about military deployments and personnel decisions, they shall generally seek to obtain the advice of the military's Officers and are prohibited from retaliation against Officers for disagreements, unless the Officer acts in defiance of the Prime Minister's orders.

(9) The Prime Minister shall be responsible for maintaining and building community activity across all communications platforms of the Coalition, including at least its forum, Discord server, and the regional message board.

(15) (10) The Prime Minister executive may issue exercise the collective authority of executive orders, by unanimous consent among the Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers. Executive orders may only be issued to address an immediate and pressing issue created by ambiguity or holes in a particular law, which will immediately have the effect of law. (16) Upon declaring an executive order, the order will be presented automatically to the Assembly for three days of debate, followed by a vote according to legislative rules, where it will expire and its effects shall be reversed if the Assembly does not incorporate it into law.

(17) The Prime Minister, Cabinet ministers, and other executive offices may elect to appoint deputies and advisors, who will be considered junior members of their respective offices, but will not have voting rights in any executive decision.

[...]

XI. RECALLS AND MOTIONS OF NO CONFIDENCE

Establishing a method to hold government officials to account.

(1) Any official of the Coalition may be recalled by an Assembly resolution passed with a three-fifths majority of those voting.
a. Recalls should only be initiated for dereliction of duty, abuse of authority, or violations of the law, and not for purposes of political rivalry.
b. Upon initiation, recall resolutions must be debated for three days and receive a motion and second before being put to vote.
c. Upon passage, the recalled official will immediately be removed from office.
d. In the event of the recall of the Prime Minister, it triggers a special Prime Minister election in a manner put forth by the Assembly in law.
e. In the event of the recall of a Cabinet minister, the Prime Minister may nominate a new Minister for the office, but is prohibited from nominating the recalled individual to any Cabinet ministry for the duration of the term.

(2) A Motion of No Confidence may be initiated by the Assembly if the members have lost faith in the effectiveness and activities of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Motions of No Confidence must be debated for three days and receive a motion and a second before being moved to vote. Passage requires three-fifths majority support of those voting, and triggers a special election for all Cabinet offices.

[...]

X. THE MILITARY

Creating an official military for the purposes of regional defense, war, and gameplay.

(1) The South Pacific Special Forces will be the official military forces of the Coalition. Their responsibilities will be to enact the government’s military policies abroad, foster activity for the region, and serve as a representative of the Coalition’s power and influence.

(2) The military will be led by the Minister of Defense Prime Minister, along with a corps of Officers generals appointed by the Minister and approved by the Assembly. The Minister and general corps may establish further hierarchy, create programs, and appoint deputies as they see necessary. The Prime Minister will have the ultimate authority over the military, including in deployments, personnel matters, and promotions, subject to the provisions of applicable law.

(3) The military will have the support of the Coalition in conducting operations to protect innocent regions from attack and oppression and promote legitimate, native democratic institutions across the world. The military may not colonize or annex any region without the express permission direction of the Cabinet Prime Minister and approval, by majority vote, of the Assembly, by majority vote of both chambers. Nor may the military attack, subjugate, purge, destroy, or vandalize any regions, excepting those regions which espouse hateful ideologies and those regions against which the Coalition has declared an official state of war.

(4) The Minister of Defense will coordinate with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to ensure that no military activities harm the government’s diplomatic affairs or public relations.

Elections Act

An act establishing elections for office

[...]

4. Offices of the Cabinet

(1) On the first of every February, May, August, and November February, June and October, the Assembly will convene to elect the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
a. After the first 3 4 days of the election period, during which legislators may declare their candidacy and campaign for only one position, and a campaign-only period of two days, where candidates may campaign and the Assembly will debate the merits of their platforms, the Assembly will vote for 2 3 days.
b. For each position, t The respective winner, as decided using Instant-Runoff Voting, will be declared the Prime Minister-elect by the Election Commissioner.

(2) The terms for the incoming Prime Minister and their appointed Cabinet ministers will begin the one week after elections. Before this inauguration, any and all election-related disputes must be settled. The outgoing Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers will maintain their offices until then. During this transition period, the Prime Minister shall nominate Cabinet ministers for confirmation by the Assembly, with the goal that the initial slate of Cabinet nominees be confirmed or rejected by the end of the transition period.

[...]

6. Vacancies of Office

(1) A special election will be held for vacancies arising within the Cabinet, if at least half of the term remains. If less than half of the term remains, or the position is vacant due to nobody running in its election, the Cabinet may appoint a replacement until the next regularly scheduled election.

(1) A special election will be held for a vacancy in the office of Prime Minister. If at least half of the term remains, the Assembly shall elect a candidate to serve the remainder of the current term. If less than half of the term remains, the Assembly shall elect a candidate to serve for the remainder of the current term and the entirety of the subsequent term. To ensure continuity of governance during the election period, the Cabinet shall select amongst themselves a Prime Minister to ensure continuity of governance. A Prime Minister elected during a special election will not wait a transition period before assuming office.

 

Legislative Procedure Act

An act to define the procedural rules of the Assembly

1. Legislative Rules

[...]

(3) General laws, amendments, resolutions, and appointments to non-Cabinet positions will remain at vote for three days. Constitutional laws, constitutional amendments, resolutions dealing with matters of constitutional law, and treaties will remain at vote for five days. Appointments by the Prime Minister to Cabinet positions will remain at vote for two days.

 

Legislator Committee Act

An act to establish a commission to manage legislators

1. Scope

(1) The Legislator Committee is the commission responsible for granting and revoking legislator status to members.

(2) The Legislator Committee comprises no less than three and no more than five legislators that have each been appointed by the Cabinet Prime Minister and approved by the Assembly via a simple majority vote.

(3) A member of the Legislator Committee is removed from the committee if
a. the member resigns,
b. the member loses legislator eligibility, or
c. the member is recalled by the Assembly through regular order.

(4) If there is no member of the Legislator Committee available due to vacancy or leave, and there are outstanding duties to be performed, the Cabinet Prime Minister and the Delegate jointly may appoint an emergency member to handle any urgent matters of the committee. The Council on Regional Security may, on security grounds only, rescind the Cabinet's emergency member's appointment. The emergency member's tenure will last until the Cabinet Prime Minister or Delegate rescinds the appointment or until one week after a regular committee member is available, whichever happens sooner.

 

Sunshine Act

An act to periodically publish threads in private government forums

[...]

2. Publishing of Discussions

(1) The significant discussions of an institution shall, in due time, be released for public archival accessible to all members of the South Pacific.

(2) The release of discussions shall occur at the following times:
a. For a Cabinet Prime Minister's term, discussions from the Cabinet shall be released no later than 6 months after the completion of that term:
i) Discussions of the February to June May term are due for release in the following December November.
ii) Discussions of the June May to October August term are due for release in the following April February.
iii) Discussions of the October August to February November term are due for release in the following August May.
iv) Discussions of the November to February term are due for release in the following August.

 

World Assembly Act

An act to define the World Assembly procedures of the Coalition of the South Pacific

1. Powers

(1) The Prime Minister shall hold the ultimate authority to determine the Delegate's vote on proposed World Assembly resolutions.

(2) The Prime Minister may, at their discretion, establish a process utilizing wider input to determine the Delegate's vote on proposed World Assembly resolutions. If so, this process will be published in a public area of the regional forum. In such process, there must be a provision granting the Prime Minister the power to override a vote on a World Assembly resolution for security and diplomatic purposes.

(1) The Delegate shall cast their vote on proposed World Assembly resolutions according to voting recommendations issued by the Office of World Assembly Legislation, except under circumstances in which the Office issued a recommendation for the Delegate to abstain from voting. If the Office's recommendation is contrary to the vote of all World Assembly nations in the South Pacific, the Delegate may choose to change their vote in collaboration with the Office.

(2) In the absence of a recommendation, the Delegate shall consult with Cabinet to determine which direction to vote in. If the direction is contrary to the vote of all World Assembly nations in the South Pacific, the Delegate may choose to change their vote in collaboration with the Cabinet..

(3) The Cabinet may override a vote on a World Assembly resolution for security and diplomatic purposes.

2. Approval voting

(1) The Delegate may give an approval vote on proposed World Assembly resolutions freely or based on the instruction of the Office of World Assembly Legislation Prime Minister or designated Cabinet minister.

(2) The South Pacific Special Forces are prohibited from engaging in approval raiding, except as prescribed in the Charter.

3. Voting

(1) The Office of World Assembly Legislation shall determine the medium for voting on proposed World Assembly resolutions.

(2) Nations of the South Pacific that are World Assembly members or members of the South Pacific Special Forces may not be barred from eligibility in having their votes counted.

(3) If a nation resigns from the World Assembly or their membership in the South Pacific Special Forces before the voting period ends, their vote shall not count.

4. 3. Legal Impact of Security Council Declarations

(1) "Security Council" is an official organ of the World Assembly, to which the Delegate serves as the South Pacific’s representative.

(2) "Declaration" is an official resolution adopted by the Security Council that attempts to express the will of the Security Council on any issue under its jurisdiction.

(3) No declaration adopted by the Security Council will be recognized, abided by, or considered law by the South Pacific, unless sent to the Assembly by the Cabinet and ratified by a majority vote of the Assembly.

(4) No vote cast by the Delegate on a declaration of the Security Council will be considered implicit or explicit approval or disapproval of the declaration by the South Pacific itself.

 

Treaties Act

An act defining the Cabinet’s treaty powers

1. Assembly Ratification

(1) Upon the receipt of a treaty by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Prime Minister or a designated Cabinet member, the Assembly will debate the proposed treaty for at least five days before any vote is held.

(2) Amendments to existing treaties must be ratified under the same protocols as original treaties.

2. Treaty Dissolution and Repeal

(1) A treaty will be dissolved if the Cabinet Prime Minister or a designated Cabinet member reports to the Assembly that a signatory to the treaty has violated its terms. The dissolution report must include detailed evidence, which will be up for a commenting period in the Assembly for one week before the dissolution is legally binding.

(2) If a signatory to a treaty notifies the Cabinet Prime Minister or a designated Cabinet member that they have dissolved the treaty on their end, the Cabinet Prime Minister or a designated Cabinet member will swiftly notify the Assembly. The treaty will be dissolved automatically upon Assembly notification.

(3) Should the Cabinet Prime Minister wish to dissolve a treaty for reasons other than the violation of its terms, they (or a designated Cabinet member) must notify the Assembly. The Assembly will debate for at least five days, and then vote on its repeal. Should a vote on its repeal pass with majority support, the treaty will be dissolved officially, and the signatory notified promptly.

3. Supremacy Clause

(1) The terms of the Charter and of this act are held supreme over terms found within a treaty. No treaty may contradict or violate the laws of the Coalition.

 

Regional Officers Act

An act providing for the granting of Regional Officer powers to government officials

[...]

2. Regional Officers

[...]

(2) The Prime Minister will be granted all non-Border Control powers.

(3) The Prime Minister will appoint up to three Cabinet ministers to Regional Officer positions, specifying when making those appointments what powers the Regional Officer should be given. The Prime Minister may allocate any combination of all non-Border Control powers to each Regional Officer they appoint. These appointments will last for the duration of the Prime Minister's term. The remaining Cabinet ministers will be allotted up to three Regional Officer positions and granted Appearance, Communications, and Polls powers. They will decide which Cabinet ministers among them will be granted Embassies power.

[...]

3. Executive Discretion

(1) The Cabinet Prime Minister and/or Delegate may grant Communications, Appearance, and Polls powers to regional members as they see fit.

[...]

4. Limitations

[...]

(3) Exercise of Regional Officer powers must follow all applicable laws and rules. Behavior unbecoming of a representative of the South Pacific may result in suspension of Regional Officer power, even for ministers, as determined by a majority of the Cabinet the Prime Minister.

 

Proscription Act

An act to grant authority to declare hostile persons or organizations prohibited from entering or residing in the Coalition

[...]

3. Grant of Authority

(1) The Prime Minister Cabinet or the Council on Regional Security may proscribe an individual that is not a member of the Coalition, or a foreign region or organization, that they determine to be hostile. The Prime Minister Cabinet together with the Council on Regional Security may proscribe a member or a group of members that they determine to be hostile.

Military Code

An act establishing the rules and regulations of military forces

1. General Corps Governance

(1) The Prime Minister is the civilian commander-in-chief of the military. No member of the military may refuse any lawful order or direction of the Prime Minister or of any civilian officer.

(2) The Prime Minister may, at their discretion, appoint a Cabinet minister responsible for further civilian oversight, maintenance, and growth of the military. Any such Cabinet minister is considered an ex officio member of the General Corps.

(3) The General Corps is a commission which is collectively responsible for planning and overseeing missions of the military, deciding personnel matters including applications and promotions, and providing military advice to the Prime Minister. A member of the General Corps shall be referred to as a General.

(4) The Prime Minister will have the power to appoint and dismiss Generals.
a. The Assembly may, by majority vote, overturn the decision to appoint or dismiss a General.
b. The Assembly may, by majority vote, recall a General.

It is unlawful for the Prime Minister to dismiss a General for providing dissenting opinions or advice to the Prime Minister's perspective, unless the General refuses to follow a lawful order given by the Prime Minister.

(1) The General Corps is a commission comprising up to three Commanders and the Minister of Defense. A Commander on the General Corps shall be called a General.

(2) The General Corps shall be the supreme entity leading the military, hold responsibility for the planning and overseeing all missions of the military, decide all personnel matters including applications and promotions, and handle disciplinary actions as a tribunal.

(3) In case of a vacancy on the General Corps, the Minister of Defense may appoint a Commander with approval by the Assembly to become a General. Should there be no Generals, the military shall not operate except for the self-defense of the South Pacific, for the defense of an ally, or for the purposes of explicit treaty obligations.

(4) A General is removed from the General Corps if
a. the General no longer holds the rank of Commander (temporary demotions shall not be considered for this purpose),
b. a simple majority of the General Corps votes for the removal, or
c. the General is recalled by the Assembly through regular order.

2. Ranks

(1) The attainable ranks in the military are, from lowest to highest:
a. Trainee, which is the entry rank for any new member of the military, regardless of prior experience;
b. Soldier, which is the rank for which a member of the military is considered to be able to autonomously follow any order described in battlefield-typical terms;
c. Officer, which is for individuals deemed capable of leading troops in operations;
d. Commander General, which is considered the rank that can plan and execute larger, potentially long-term operations.

(2) The General Corps may introduce specialized ranks within the main ranks at its discretion.

(3) The General Corps shall define rank requirements for each rank, which must be viewable by any member of the military. The requirements must include objective criteria based on operations performed by the individual in the name of this military, as well as subjective criteria based on the General Corps's judgement of the individual's character as it relates to the specific rank to be attained.

(4) For the rank requirements for Commanders Generals, the General Corps must include criteria that require state-of-the-art skills and knowledge required for liberating a large game-created region.

(5) When rank requirements are changed such that there are members of the military that no longer qualify for their current rank, the General Corps must grant a reasonable grace time for affected members to meet these new requirements before they are demoted.

3. Rules

(1) A member of the military must show respectful behavior towards a superior, must not bully, humiliate, or intimidate their subordinates, and must not act in an unbecoming manner toward their peers.

(2) A member of the military may not intentionally or recklessly disobey a lawful command given by a superior, or intentionally or recklessly put at risk, delay, or otherwise disrupt a lawful operation.
a. It is unlawful for a member of the military to be dismissed for giving dissenting opinions or advice to a superior's perspective, unless they refuse to follow a lawful order or recklessly the success of a lawful operation.

(3) A member of the military may only be a member of another military with assent of the General Corps, which it may rescind at any time and for any reason. If the member's other military is on the opposing side of an arbitrary R/D conflict, the member may not change sides for the duration of the operation, and shall be considered suspended from the military for the duration of the operation should they be engaged on the opposing side.

(4) A member of the military must not aid the enemy. A member who is also a member of another military and engaged alongside that military on the opposing side during an arbitrary R/D conflict shall not be considered in conflict of this rule.

(5) A member of the military may not obtain or attempt to obtain confidential information with the intent to disclose it to individuals or organizations not authorized to possess it.

(6) A member of the military is required to perform at least one mission every calendar month, unless suspended or granted leave by the General Corps.

(7) The General Corps may instate additional rules that do not contradict rules stated here at its discretion. These rules must be publicly visible.

4. Disciplinary Actions

(1) The General Corps is responsible for determining whether a member of the military has conducted themselves in a way not befitting their rank or not befitting their membership in the military. Upon making such a determination, the General Corps will issue one or more disciplinary actions as appropriate, keeping in mind the severity of the infraction and the individual's disciplinary history.

(2) A disciplinary action given to a member of the military can be any one of:
a. Temporary demotion, in which the affected member must serve under a lower effective rank for a duration of up to one month;
b. Indefinite demotion, in which the affected member's effective rank is indefinitely lowered by virtue of no longer meeting rank requirements;
c. Suspension, in which the affected member may not serve the military for a duration of up to one month;
d. Honorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty in good faith;
e. Dishonorable discharge, in which the affected member is dismissed of duty and not permitted to return without special assent of the Assembly.

(3) A member of the military subject to a disciplinary action may appeal that disciplinary action and offer a defense to be reviewed by the General Corps. If an amicable resolution cannot be achieved, the member may demand that the charge be brought to the High Court. In this case, the court shall conduct a trial akin to a criminal trial, in which General Corps shall act as the Complainant, the accused member as the Accused, and the disciplinary actions listed herein shall be used by the court for sentencing.

Minister of Foreign Affairs
General of the South Pacific Special Forces
Ambassador to Balder
Former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense

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